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  INTRODUCTION   
Coordination among nations over the taxation of interna-
tional transactions rests on a network of some 2000 bilateral 
double tax treaties. The double tax treaties are, in many ways, 
the roots of the international system. That system, however, is 
in upheaval in the face of globalization, technological advances, 
abuse by treaty beneficiaries, and shifting political tides. Yet se-
rious examination of the worthiness of tax treaties is largely con-
fined to the albeit important question of whether tax treaties are 
beneficial for developing countries. Surprisingly little to no con-
sideration has been paid to whether developed countries should 
continue to sign tax treaties with one another. In fact, little evi-
dence or theory exists to support entrance into a tax treaty by 
countries like the United States. And, in some cases, tax treaties 
may be detrimental to their interests.  
Although tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary 
purposes, modern circumstances call into question their neces-
sity. In short, tax treaties do not fulfill their purported objec-
tives. Instead of alleviating double taxation, a dubious goal in 
and of itself for many reasons, the treaties are the means to 
achieve double non-taxation. This is because the tax treaties al-
locate taxing jurisdiction to the country of the taxpayer’s resi-
dence, which often fails to impose a tax. Moreover, there is little 
evidence substantiating the claim that the treaties increase for-
eign direct investment. This is especially the case for a country 
like the United States, which does not benefit from the comity 
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considerations that the treaty system imparts. Functions such 
as information exchange may provide benefits but can be 
achieved through standalone treaties that do not allocate taxing 
jurisdiction.  
Rather than meet their intended goals, tax treaties may in-
flict harm. Although recent scholarship laments the revenue 
losses imposed by the treaty system on developing countries,1 
even developed countries may lose revenue if they are net capi-
tal-importing. Although the United States was a capital exporter 
at the dawn of the treaty age, its role has since shifted. In fact, 
data that I have collected calls into question the widespread as-
sumption that the United States gains revenues through the 
treaty system. It is my hope that these findings shift the burden 
onto treaty proponents to conduct formal revenue and economic 
analyses of treaties to justify their continuation. It perhaps 
seems surprising that these concerns have not been explored by 
policymakers in the United States but, as this Article argues, is 
less so when one considers the limited process and political econ-
omy dynamics to which such treaties are subject.2  
Furthermore, the treaty system impedes fundamental re-
form of the international tax system. In the aftermath of recent 
tax legislation, many commentators have judged policies based 
on their compatibility with tax treaties.3 I argue that such criti-
cism is misplaced; tax reform will continue to be in tension with 
 
 1. Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties, in 
51 SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE 159, 
159–62 (Geerten M.M. Michielse & Victor Thuronyi eds., 2015); see, e.g., John 
F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999); Allison 
D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 644 (2005); Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties 
Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 941 (2000); Alex Easson, Do We Still 
Need Tax Treaties?, 54 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 619, 619–20 
(2000); Lee A. Sheppard, How Can Vulnerable Countries Cope with Tax Avoid-
ance?, 69 TAX NOTES INT’L 410, 410 (2013); Richard J. Vann, International As-
pects of Income Taxation, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 718, 720 (Victor 
Thuronyi ed., 1998). 
 2. The process by which tax treaties are enacted stands in stark contrast 
to trade agreements, which are subject to full consideration in the Senate and 
House. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 1, 33 (2013) (“[Tax t]reaties are . . . approved without fanfare by only 
part of Congress.”).  
 3. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah & Bret Wells, The BEAT and Treaty Over-
rides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 383, 
383 (2018); H. David Rosenbloom & Fadi Shaheen, The BEAT and the Treaties, 
92 TAX NOTES INT’L 53, 53 (2018). 
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tax treaties precisely because the premise underlying the trea-
ties has proven unworkable. Moreover, incremental change that 
comes from the sovereign exercise of taxing power may spur a 
more rational approach to international taxation. This bottom-
up rebuilding of the international tax regime is likely a neces-
sary step on the way to true international tax reform. Although 
there will be a temporary disruption to the international tax or-
der, and one which will certainly pose transition costs, such ad-
justments are inevitable in the transition to the modern global 
and digital economy. 
One way to ease the transition would be to employ an or-
dered mechanism to discard or scale down those treaty provi-
sions that do the most harm—the ones that allocate taxing juris-
diction. One possible method is to leverage the OECD’s new 
multilateral instrument that is currently being used to add anti-
avoidance principles, new residency safeguards, and other pro-
visions to existing treaties.4 Just as the new multilateral instru-
ment can be used to supplement the tax treaties, it can also be 
used to dismantle their most noxious aspects, while leaving the 
more useful, or at least less harmful, provisions in place. It could 
also be used to reduce unnecessary mismatches in tax systems, 
coordinating definitions of income, residency, and source, all 
without forsaking taxing rights. Rather than assessing unwork-
able notions of economic neutrality, the challenge for the inter-
national tax system going forward will be to attempt some de-
gree of coordination while also giving credence to national 
interests in setting revenue policy.5 This solution aims to thread 
that needle. 
The new OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Pro-
gramme of Work (known in the industry as “BEPS 2.0”), the de-
tails of which were announced as this Article was in its late 
stages of production, could be seen as support for this Article’s 
thesis. Ambitious in scope, BEPS 2.0 addresses tax challenges of 
 
 4. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MULTILATERAL CONVENTION 
TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION 
AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2017) (suggesting improvements to tax treaties). 
 5. See, e.g., TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COM-
PETITION AND COOPERATION 7 (2018) (arguing that the new international tax 
system must navigate between competition and cooperation); DANIEL N. 
SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 1–4 (2014) (questioning use-
fulness of notions of worldwide efficiency); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing Interna-
tional Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory 
Policy, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001) (same). 
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the new economy by modifying taxing rights and nexus rules and 
by proposing a global minimum tax and inbound base erosion 
rules.6 BEPS 2.0 would require radical revisions to existing tax 
treaties, in particular those provisions that I identify to be the 
most harmful.7 
In Part I, this Article traces the history of the international 
tax and the bilateral tax treaty system up through the recent 
2017 U.S. tax legislation. Part II explores the stated and un-
stated purposes of tax treaties, concluding that they ultimately 
fall short from the perspective of the United States. Part III ex-
amines possible harmful effects of the treaty regime, including 
revenue considerations, loss of autonomy over revenue policy, 
the hindrance of tax reform, and tax avoidance. Part IV offers 
process and political economy reasons for why U.S. treaty policy 
seems so misaligned with the national interest. Part V looks at 
ways in which the new multilateral instrument can be utilized 
to shed the most harmful treaty provisions while retaining, and 
perhaps creating, others.  
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX AND 
TREATY SYSTEM   
Before investigating whether the current tax treaty system 
is effectuating its goals, it is useful to understand its roots. This 
Part explores the history of the global international tax system, 
beginning with the pre-tax treaty era. It then outlines the pur-
poses and features of tax treaties. It concludes by discussing the 
current domestic rules on international tax.  
 
 6. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PROGRAMME OF WORK TO 
DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE 
DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (2019) [hereinafter OECD, INCLUSIVE 
FRAMEWORK], https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a 
-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of 
-the-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/65XR-JZK5] (suggesting myriad solutions to 
tax challenges); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SECRETARIAT PRO-
POSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH” UNDER PILLAR ONE (2019), https://www 
.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified 
-approach-pillar-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9G6-8Z57] (same); ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOBAL ANTI-BASE EROSION PROPOSAL (“GLOBE”)—PIL-
LAR TWO (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document 
-global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RYW 
-J67N] (same). 
 7. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
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A. THE ROOTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM 
The primary predicament underlying international taxation 
is whether income should be taxed by the country in which the 
taxpayer resides (the residence country) or by the country where 
the income is earned (the source country).8 International tax 
rules endeavor to resolve this dilemma by deciding which coun-
try gets to tax the income.9  
Deferring to either the source or residence country alleviates 
double taxation; but the two approaches differ as to which coun-
try gets the revenue.10 Typically, creditor—or capital-export-
ing—countries will favor residence-based taxation while 
debtor—or capital-importing—countries favor source-based tax-
ation.11 For instance, assume that there are two countries, 
France and Great Britain. A French business borrows money 
from a bank in Great Britain, and the question becomes whether 
France, as the source country where the business is located and 
where the business income is generated, or Great Britain, as the 
residence country of the bank getting the interest, gets to tax the 
interest income. If a country is capital-exporting, like Great Brit-
ain in this example, it will prefer a residence-based approach be-
cause it will get the revenues. If a country is capital-importing, 
like France, then a source-based approach yields it greater tax 
dollars.  
The traditional historical account of international taxation 
emphasizes a 1923 report for the League of Nations by four econ-
omists (1923 Report), led by Edwin Seligman, an economist at 
Columbia University.12 The 1923 Report rejected source-based 
taxation as resting upon a fallacy of the “benefits” theory of tax-
ation—an exchange of government services for taxes.13 Instead, 
its drafters subscribed to the theory of taxation based on ability 
to pay concerns, i.e., those with the most resources contribute 
 
 8. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1033 (1997); see, e.g., Ke Chin 
Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through International 
Agreement, 1921-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 81–82 (1945). 
 9. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8. 
 10. Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 717, 739–40. 
 11. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1033–34. 
 12. Report Presented by Professors Bivens, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Jo-
siah Stamp on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee, League 
of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73 F.19 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Report]. 
 13. Id. at 18, 48. 
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the most to revenues.14 Ability to pay supports taxation by the 
residence country since it is that country that is able to ascertain 
the worldwide income of its residents, not the country of source.15 
Importantly, the four economists recognized that capital-import-
ing nations would not fare as well under the residence-based ap-
proach and therefore recommended that such division of taxing 
jurisdiction only made sense where countries had similar econo-
mies.16 
Several years later in 1928, the League of Nations drafted 
model bilateral income tax treaties for the relief of double taxa-
tion, which were influenced by the 1923 Report as well as other 
precedents.17 The League of Nations treaty was generous to the 
residence country, allocating investment income principally to 
that country.18 Although the source country had taxing jurisdic-
tion over business income, such jurisdiction was limited to in-
stances where the enterprise had a permanent establishment.19  
The League of Nations treaty rejected an earlier model 
treaty, which would have utilized a methodology to split profits 
between source and residence countries in accordance with cri-
teria such as sales.20 In so doing, it catered to the mercantilist 
countries, who wished to tax more income as countries of resi-
dence rather than allocate income to where economic activity oc-
curred.21 The rationale for this framework was premised on the 
“mercantilist belief that imperial countries were the source of 
 
 14. Id. at 18. 
 15. See Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income 
of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 22 (1993). 
 16. 1923 Report, supra note 12, at 48–49. 
 17. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1078 (emphasizing the 1923 Report, 
along with other sources such as the early U.S. international tax legislation and 
the work of the International Chamber of Commerce, as influences on the 
League of Nations treaty). 
 18. See Report Presented by the General Meeting of Governmental Experts 
on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562.M.178. 
1928.II.A., at 16–17 (1928). 
 19. Id. at 16. 
 20. Bret Wells & Cym H. Lowell, Income Tax Treaty Policy in the 21st Cen-
tury: Residence v. Source, 5 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2013).  
 21. Id. at 34. As Wells & Lowell note, the discussion in the archives with 
regard to the political realities was “amazingly frank.” Id. The framers of the 
treaty all seemed to be aware that capital exporting nations were benefitting 
from the choice at the expense of the colonized. 
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capital and know-how while the colonies were passive suppliers 
of goods or services with little value-added functionality.”22 
The 1928 model treaty served as the backbone of the tax 
treaty network, influencing the model income tax treaties of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the United Nations, and the United States. The inter-
national tax system evolved such that the default was source-
based taxation with treaties as an elective, bilateral mechanism 
for countries to shift to residence-based taxation.23 Even today, 
the more than 3000 bilateral income tax treaties have a funda-
mental structure based on the League of Nations treaty.24 This 
residence-based approach to taxation has since been embraced 
by the United States Treasury Department numerous times25 
and, more generally, through the United States’ adherence to the 
double income tax treaty system.26  
The world has obviously changed since the 1920s, with a 
massive growth in international capital flows, the creation of the 
global economy, and the rise of the multinational corporation. 
All of these developments increase the stakes at issue but also 
underscore that the foundations of the international tax sys-
tem—the categories of source and residence—are inherently 
malleable concepts. Multinational corporations can avoid taxa-
 
 22. Id. at 10.  
 23. Rosenzweig, supra note 10, at 741–42. 
 24. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A 
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996). The UN Model 
treaty gives more generous taxing rights to source countries, but it is funda-
mentally based on the OECD Model, and its influence has been limited. Sergio 
André Rocha, International Fiscal Imperialism and the “Principle” of the Per-
manent Establishment, 64 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 1, 2 (2014).  
 25. DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS 
FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 89–90 (2d ed., rev. 1984); Selected Tax Policy Implica-
tions of Global Electronic Commerce, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 226, Nov. 22, 
1996, at 16; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX 
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (1985) 
(proposing residence-based taxation). 
 26. To be sure, the origins of the international tax system are not neat and 
tidy. The foreign tax credit rules of the early international tax system, for in-
stance, were swayed by a key Treasury advisor, T.S. Adams, who argued for the 
primacy of source-based rather than residence-based taxation. Graetz & 
O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1027. Although residence-based taxation has reigned 
supreme since the dawn of the tax treaty system, this is more of a departure 
from, rather than a continuation of, the original international tax rules of the 
United States. Id. at 1027–28. 
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tion by shifting capital income and IP to tax havens and by arbi-
traging differences in tax systems. The transfer pricing regime 
that attempts to stop profit shifting is premised on a legal fiction, 
dividing an economic firm into legal units from various coun-
tries, that thus far has proven unenforceable.27 Finally, compe-
tition for investment and capital has created aggressive tax com-
petition, leaving many nations starved for revenue.28  
It thus is worth examining whether the approach to inter-
national tax embodied in the treaty system continues to be rele-
vant. For decades, the international tax system was praised as 
“remarkably stable and successful,”29 but few would conclude 
that this continues to be the case. 
B. PURPOSES AND FEATURES OF TAX TREATIES 
Tax treaties have stated and unstated purposes. First and 
foremost among the former, tax treaties are designed to elimi-
nate double taxation.30 Double taxation occurs when more than 
one country lays claim to taxing an item of income.31 Tax treaties 
attempt to deal with double taxation by either (1) limiting source 
country taxation on investment income or business income that 
 
 27. Patricia Gimbel Lewis, What You Really Need To Know About Transfer 
Pricing, CORP. COUNS. BUS. J. (June 25, 2012), https://ccbjournal.com/articles/ 
what-you-really-need-know-about-transfer-pricing [https://perma.cc/PF94 
-92TH] (“The proliferation of transfer pricing rules and their enforcement 
around the world threatens to strangle our tax system and that of other coun-
tries in trying to administer these rules.”). 
 28. Michael J. Graetz, Foreword—The 2017 Tax Cuts: How Polarized Poli-
tics Produced Precarious Policy, 128 YALE L.J.F. 315, 328 (2018).  
 29. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 8, at 1026; see also Jones, supra note 1,  
at 2.  
 30. Almost all tax treaties emphasize their purpose of avoiding double tax-
ation by stating in the recital of the treaty the following: “Convention Between 
the United States of America and ___ for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income.” Philip F. 
Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and 
a Modest Proposal, 52 TAX L. 731, 734 n.2 (1999). The OECD Model Convention 
makes no explicit mention of avoiding double taxation, but did so until 1977. 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL I-7 (ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., 2017) [hereinafter OECD MODEL TREATY]. The preamble to 
the treaty was changed not to reject that purpose but to account for the fact that 
the treaty also addressed other concerns as well. Id.; Mitchell A. Kane, Interna-
tional Tax Reform, the Tragedy of the Commons, and Bilateral Tax Treaties 42 
(May 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 31. Marius Eugene Radu, International Double Taxation, 62 PROCEDIA 
SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 403, 403 (2012). 
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lacks a significant and continuous presence in the source country 
(the permanent establishment requirement), (2) requiring the 
residence country to provide an exemption of foreign source in-
come or a tax credit for foreign taxes paid, or (3) coordinating the 
rules of both countries.32 Tax treaties further establish compe-
tent authority procedures, and, more recently, binding arbitra-
tion, such that tax authorities commit to resolving issues of dou-
ble taxation.33 Tax treaties also endeavor to refine definitions of 
residency to reduce instances of double taxation.34  
Another stated goal of tax treaties is to limit fiscal evasion. 
Treaties attempt to achieve this through information sharing 
provisions, which require tax authorities to disclose information 
to one another regarding taxpayers residing in one country who 
have tax obligations in the other country.35 These provisions typ-
ically override domestic confidentiality laws that bar govern-
ments from releasing tax information.36 This enables the resi-
dence country to more readily identify foreign source income of 
its residents.  
In recent years, tax treaties have been critiqued for focusing 
solely on double taxation rather than double non-taxation, which 
has plagued the international tax system in recent decades.37 In 
response to these concerns, there are efforts to revise the stated 
purposes of treaties. As a result of the OECD/G20’s project 
 
 32. Rosenzweig, supra note 10, at 729, 739–40; see, e.g., UNITED STATES 
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 23 (U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2016) 
[hereinafter U.S. MODEL TREATY] (“[D]ouble taxation will be relieved as fol-
lows . . . In accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations of the 
law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to time without chang-
ing the general principle hereof), the United States shall allow to a resident or 
citizen of the United States as a credit against the United States tax on income 
applicable to residents and citizens: . . . the income tax paid or accrued to [the 
other treaty country] by or on behalf of such resident or citizen . . . .”). 
 33. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 25. 
 34. See, e.g., id. art. 4. 
 35. See, e.g., id. art. 26 (requiring the competent authorities of each treaty 
party to share information that would assist in carrying out the treaty provi-
sions or domestic tax laws).  
 36. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., KEEPING IT SAFE: THE 
OECD GUIDE ON THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION EX-
CHANGED FOR TAX PURPOSES 11 (2012). 
 37. This dynamic partially stems from tax competition, which distorts the 
allocation of capital and results in revenue losses worldwide. Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576–78 (2000). 
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against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS project), a mul-
tilateral instrument has been developed to update existing tax 
treaties to conform to treaty-related minimum standards and to 
close gaps with existing rules. The multilateral instrument al-
lows countries to choose among various off-the-shelf updates to 
existing tax treaties.38 Through a novel matching process, if a 
country’s partners in existing tax treaties also choose a particu-
lar change, the treaty is automatically updated subject to domes-
tic ratification procedures.39  
The new instrument provides an option whereby treaty 
countries can adopt a preamble that commits to the elimination 
of double taxation “without creating opportunities for non-taxa-
tion or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance.”40 It 
implements this language through rules such as minimum 
standards limiting treaty shopping, a new anti-abuse standard, 
and rules against hybrid mismatches.41 The United States 
Treasury indicated that the United States did not sign the in-
strument, in part, because U.S. domestic tax provisions, as well 
as its negotiating position for a number of years, already limit 
treaty shopping and abuse.42 Sixty-eight countries and jurisdic-
tions have, however, signed on to the effort.43 
 
 38. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4 (providing op-
tions a party may apply to its tax treaties). 
 39. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MULTILATERAL INSTRU-
MENT MATCHING DATABASE, https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/MLI-database 
-disclaimer-and-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/36GF-RQAU]. 
 40. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4, art. 6, ¶ 1 (em-
phasis added). The multilateral instrument further provides that the partici-
pating countries can amend their treaties preamble to include a desire “to de-
velop an economic relationship” between the treaty countries or “to enhance 
their co-operation in tax matters.” Id. art. 6, ¶ 3.  
 41. Id. art. 7.  
 42. See Jessica Silbering-Meyer, 68 Sign the Multilateral Instrument, REU-
TERS: ANSWERS FOR TAX PROF. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://blogs.thomsonreuters 
.com/answerson/68-sign-the-multilateral-instrument-mli/ [https://perma.cc/ 
84RF-XDZA]. Treaty shopping provisions are aimed at reducing the ability of 
residents of non-treaty party jurisdictions to obtain benefits of the treaties. ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 4, at 8. The new anti-abuse rule 
is formulated as a general test whereby the “principal purpose” of transactions 
have to be unrelated to obtaining treaty benefits. Id. at 23. The hybrid mismatch 
rules aim to neutralize the ability for taxpayers to produce multiple deductions 
for a single expense or to obtain a deduction in one jurisdiction with no offsetting 
income inclusion in another jurisdiction. Id. at 84. 
 43. Five Things To Know About the OECD’s Multilateral Instrument, DAILY 
TAX REP. (BNA) No. 116, June 16, 2017, at I1. 
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Although the treaties themselves, as well as treaty commen-
taries, refer to the elimination of double taxation as their pri-
mary goal, some commentators have emphasized that modern 
tax treaties have focused primarily on the reduction of withhold-
ing taxes.44 Although addressing double taxation necessarily 
leads to a reduction in tax liability, the inverse is not true. Thus, 
tax treaties may simply reduce tax rates without addressing 
double taxation.45  
The following chart summarizes the main features of tax 
treaties and specifies the corresponding article of the treaties. In 
Part V, I revisit this chart to discuss which articles of the treaties 
should be maintained or should be unraveled. I refer to features 
2 and 3, which together limit source country taxation over busi-
ness and investment income, as the “jurisdictional provisions” of 
tax treaties. These provisions are the primary subject of my cri-
tique. 
Main Treaty Features Article Number46 
1. Residency Rules/Limitation on  
Benefits 
Articles 4, 22 
2. Permanent Establishment  
Requirement (Jurisdictional  
Provision) 
Articles 5, 7 
3. Limiting Source Country  
Withholding Tax on Investment  
Income (Jurisdictional  
Provision) 
Articles 10–13 
4. Alleviation of Double Tax  
Requirements 
Article 23 
5. Non-Discrimination Provisions Article 24 
6. Transfer Pricing/Dispute  
Resolution 
Article 25 




 44. See, e.g., Patrick Driessen, Is There a Tax Treaty Insularity Complex?, 
135 TAX NOTES 745, 748 (2012). 
 45. Id.  
 46. The Articles in the chart refer to U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32. 
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C. THE DOMESTIC RULES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
1. Worldwide v. Territorial  
Tax treaties lack operative provisions of law. Instead, they 
mostly function as jurisdictional overlays to the domestic rules 
of taxation, restricting a state’s claim to tax a certain item of in-
come.47 Tax treaties limit the domestic rules by allocating the 
right to tax income to one treaty country or by requiring relief 
from double taxation.48 Importantly, a tax treaty does not create 
tax obligations, which are created by the operative domestic 
law.49 Additionally, under the “savings” clause of the treaties, 
the residence countries retain the right to tax worldwide in-
come.50 Thus, the curtailment of source country jurisdiction only 
applies to foreign nationals, not to a resident of the contracting 
state.  
The domestic rules of international tax are as varied as the 
number of countries that employ them, but a few generalizations 
can be made. Commentators refer to two different types of inter-
national tax systems: worldwide and territorial.51 A worldwide 
system of taxation subjects foreign earnings to taxation, typi-
cally with relief of double taxation through a foreign tax credit.52 
A territorial system of taxation exempts such earnings alto-
gether.53 
The majority of developed countries have shifted, in recent 
decades, towards territoriality.54 In reality, however, the distinc-
tion between territorial systems and worldwide systems is 
blurred, and the systems exist along a continuum.55 Developed 
 
 47. Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 
1411 (2016).  
 48. For instance, Article 12 of the U.S. Model Treaty provides only the coun-
try of residence can tax royalty income. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 
12. Article 23 requires the provision of tax credits to alleviate double taxation. 
Id. art. 23. 
 49. See Kysar, supra note 47, at 1411. 
 50. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, ¶ 4.  
 51. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Expanded Worldwide Versus Ter-
ritorial Taxation After the TCJA, 161 TAX NOTES 1173, 1173 (2018). 
 52. Id. at 1174. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 1175. 
 55. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44013, CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (BEPS): 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DATA 17–18 (2015) (discussing the futility of the 
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countries with territorial systems, for instance, have anti-profit 
shifting rules that tax certain types of highly mobile foreign in-
come, which are presumed to be located offshore simply for tax 
reasons.56 These foreign systems could thus be more properly de-
scribed as quasi-territorial. The United States’ international tax 
system, both new and old, also lies on a spectrum, as discussed 
below. 
2. The U.S. Rules—Pre- and Post-2017 
Experts often referred to the former U.S. international tax 
system as worldwide since it subjected foreign earnings to U.S. 
taxation.57 However, the former system never fully taxed these 
earnings. Taxation could be deferred, even indefinitely, by park-
ing active income in foreign subsidiaries.58 In contrast, taxation 
could not be deferred on passive income, which was, and still is, 
taxed on a current basis under the anti-deferral rules of subpart 
F and the passive foreign investment company regime.59 Addi-
tionally, the transfer pricing regime attempted to prevent com-
panies from shifting too much income abroad to their foreign af-
filiates by charging non-arm’s length prices. These rules are 
notoriously ineffective, yet they continue to be relevant under 
the new system. 
Since the taxation of foreign source income by the United 
States might subject such income to double taxation, the United 
States has long offered a foreign tax credit for foreign taxes paid 
 
worldwide and territorial labels); Daniel N. Shaviro, The New Non-Territorial 
U.S. International Tax System, 160 TAX NOTES 57, 57 (2018).  
 56. Such rules commonly take the form of controlled foreign corporation 
(CFC) rules, which provide for current inclusion of income from closely held cor-
porations. Although historically the province of worldwide tax systems, in 1980, 
France adopted CFC rules to combat abuses of its territorial system. Sebastian 
Dueñas, CFC Rules Around the World, TAX FOUND. 5 (June 2019), https://files 
.taxfoundation.org/20190617100144/CFC-Rules-Around-the-World-FF-659.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3VC9-4TG3].  
 57. Territorial vs. Worldwide Taxation, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM. 
(Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/territorial-vs 
-worldwide-taxation [https://perma.cc/U7XN-D6LW]. 
 58. See U.S. Tax Reform: A Guide to Income Tax Accounting Considera-





 59. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 951, 1291 (2018). 
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on such income. The credit was first enacted in 1918,60 long be-
fore the United States’ entrance into its first tax treaty in 1932.61 
The effect of the credit is such that the United States collects 
residual taxation when its tax rate exceeds the foreign rate.62 
When the foreign rate equals or exceeds the U.S. rate, U.S. tax 
liability is eliminated.63  
The new regime has been labeled a territorial system be-
cause the foreign income of foreign subsidiaries can escape tax-
ation altogether through the new participation exemption provi-
sion.64 Here again, however, the territorial label fails since 
individuals, branches, and smaller shareholders are still subject 
to taxation on foreign income. Furthermore, there is a minimum 
tax regime, called the global intangible low tax income, or 
“GILTI” regime, which subjects some foreign income of 10% cor-
porate shareholders to a current 10.5% tax (and allows a foreign 
tax credit offset for 80% of foreign taxes paid).65 Lawmakers cre-
ated these worldwide features since a move to pure exemption, 
as opposed to deferral, would have worsened incentives to shift 
income abroad.  
In addition to the participation exemption and minimum tax 
regimes, the 2017 tax legislation also enacted two other notable 
reforms. In the foreign derived intangible income, or “FDII” re-
gime, Congress provided a special low rate on export income.66 
Through the base erosion anti-abuse tax, or “BEAT” regime, the 
legislation also bolstered source-based taxation by targeting 
profit stripping by U.S. firms making deductible payments to for-
eign affiliates.67 The BEAT subjects such payments to a mini-
mum tax of 10%.68 Features of these new rules are in arguable 
tension with bilateral tax treaties,69 a point which will be treated 
more fully below. 
 
 60. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).  
 61. See Herbert I. Lazerow, The United States-French Income Tax Conven-
tion, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 649 n.1 (1971).  
 62. Elisabeth A. Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in 
Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432 (1963). 
 63. Id.  
 64. This is the case so long as the domestic shareholder owns at least 10% 
of the stock of the subsidiary. 26 U.S.C. § 245A (2018).  
 65. Id. §§ 250(a)(1), 951A, 960. 
 66. Id. § 250. 
 67. Id. § 59A. 
 68. Id.  
 69. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.  
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II.  DISCARDING PURPORTED PURPOSES OF TAX 
TREATIES   
As mentioned above, there are both stated and unstated 
purposes of tax treaties.70 The treaties themselves set forth dou-
ble taxation relief and the prevention of fiscal evasion as their 
aims, yet commentators have hypothesized other motivations be-
hind the treaties as well. Part II explores how all of these goals 
go largely unfilled.  
A. ALLEVIATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION 
1. Availability of Unilateral Relief 
The need to alleviate double taxation served as the impetus 
for the tax treaty regime.71 The conventional account is that, 
without tax treaties, multiple countries will lay claim to the 
same item of income.72 The predominant explanation for why we 
care about double taxation is that it “represents an unfair bur-
den on existing investment and an arbitrary barrier to the free 
flow of international capital, goods, and persons.”73 
Tsilly Dagan has illustrated, however, that even without tax 
treaties, countries have incentives and mechanisms to alleviate 
double taxation unilaterally.74 Instead, Dagan argues that tax 
treaties serve “much less heroic goals,” such as easing adminis-
trative burdens and harmonizing tax terminology.75 More nefar-
iously, Dagan contends tax treaties shift revenues from develop-
ing to developed countries.76 The IMF has agreed with Dagan’s 
 
 70. See supra Part I. 
 71. See supra Part I.B. 
 72. Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the 
United States and Canada: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
105th Cong. 4 (1997) (“The traditional objectives of U.S. tax treaties have been 
the avoidance of international double taxation and the prevention of tax avoid-
ance and evasion.”); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 30, at I-5 (“[A] main ob-
jective of tax treaties is the avoidance of double taxation in order to reduce tax 
obstacles to cross-border services, trade and investment . . . .”).  
 73. H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty 
Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 365–66 (1981).  
 74. Dagan, supra note 1, at 941. 
 75. Id. at 939.  
 76. Id.  
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view, noting that tax treaties based on the OECD model “signif-
icantly constrain the source country’s rights” and cautions 
against developing countries entering into such treaties.77  
Dagan concludes tax treaties involve something other than 
elimination of double taxation.78 U.S. and global history lends 
support to Dagan’s conclusion. The United States enacted the 
foreign tax credit almost fifteen years before entering into tax 
treaties.79 And the credit applies to residents of non-treaty and 
treaty countries alike. Today, most countries include in their tax 
 
 77. INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF POLICY PAPER: SPILLOVERS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 12 (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/ 
eng/2014/050914.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AHY-44VB]; see also Mindy Herzfeld, 
The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 16–
17 (2017). Predating Dagan’s analysis by several decades were comments by 
Elisabeth Owens who, focusing on the United States, argued that “tax treaties 
play a very marginal role in relieving double taxation” because “the U.S. has 
unilaterally provided for the avoidance of double taxation . . . through the for-
eign tax credit provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” Owens, supra note 62, 
at 430. More recently, commentators have reflected on the diminished role of 
tax treaties but without much elaboration or normative assessment. Dagan, su-
pra note 1, at 945 (making this point); see, e.g., JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME 
55:2 (2d ed. 2000) (“Tax treaties are principally concerned with the apportion-
ment of tax revenues between the treasuries of the treaty countries.”); see also 
PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTER-
NATIONAL TAXATION 151 (1977) (concluding that double taxation is eliminated 
through unilateral measures and that tax treaties serve a more modest function 
of refining these measures to reflect the relationships of the two treaty coun-
tries); Pierre Gravelle, Tax Treaties: Concepts, Objectives and Types, 42 BULL. 
FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 522, 523 (1988) (adopting the view that tax 
treaties merely “refine[] and improve[]” the domestic mechanisms to alleviate 
double taxation); Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with 
Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1766–67 (1995) (arguing that uni-
lateral measures to reduce double taxation has lessened the need for taxpayers 
to rely on treaty provisions). The ALI, in contrast, has concluded that “[t]here is 
remarkably broad and well-established consensus among governments of vari-
ous political and economic persuasions that it is in their interest to enter into 
income tax treaties.” AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNA-
TIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II, PROPOSALS ON 
UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 5 (1992). Even the ALI, however, also 
admitted that many treaty goals can be achieved through domestic legislation, 
outside of the treaty process. Instead, countries modify their domestic laws only 
to derive reciprocal dispensations from the other country. Id. at 12–13. 
 78. Dagan, supra note 1, at 982–88. 
 79. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New 
Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Cooperation, 58 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 911, 944 (2007).  
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treaties the same mechanism for double tax relief that they pro-
vide outside of the tax treaty context.80  
2. Double Taxation Relief Through Harmonization? 
The unilateral domestic relief of double taxation through 
foreign tax credits, deductions, or exemption is not fail-safe. 
Gaps exist such that double taxation results even in the face of 
such mechanisms. Do treaties then step in to resolve such mat-
ters? If a country taxes domestic source income, then one func-
tion of a tax treaty might be to ensure that what constitutes do-
mestic (as opposed to foreign) source income is understood by all 
parties.81 In fact, treaties serve no such purposes, instead leav-
ing the definition of source to the domestic rules. Although some 
treaties contain re-sourcing rules that treat an item of income as 
foreign source if a treaty partner is permitted to tax it, these 
rules are not always comprehensive.82 This amounts to a signif-
icant amount of double taxation that is left to be resolved 
through the treaty’s administrative solutions, such as the mu-
tual agreement procedure and, increasingly, binding arbitra-
tion.83 Although such dispute resolution procedures might be im-
portant, they need not be accompanied by the shifting of tax 
jurisdiction between countries and could instead be set forth as 
standalone agreements.84  
 
 80. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 7.  
 81. Owens, supra note 62, at 430.  
 82. The U.S. Model Treaty currently has a general re-sourcing rule that is 
fairly comprehensive. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 23(3). It is 
intended to ensure that a U.S. resident can obtain a foreign tax credit when a 
treaty partner taxes the item of income in question. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS-
URY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL IN-
COME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at 74 (2006), https://www 
.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16802.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4JKZ-RKLZ]. Many treaties in force, however, have far less compre-
hensive re-sourcing rules. See TAX SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT NO. 
1313, REPORT ON TREATY RE-SOURCING RULES 26–27 (2014), https://www 
.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2014/Tax_Section_ 
Report_1313.html [https://perma.cc/HQU8-525R] (identifying treaties that ei-
ther do not have general re-sourcing language or impose limits on the general 
re-sourcing rules). 
 83. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 25 (describing the mutual 
agreement procedures for resolving disagreements that arise under the treaty). 
 84. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 166. 
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Treaties also do not resolve conflicts of characterization, 
again leaving a significant amount of double taxation in place.85 
This is because the treaties defer to the domestic rules to assign 
character of income. For instance, suppose the residence country 
characterizes income as royalties, thereby concluding that such 
income is exempt from source country taxation under the treaty 
and is taxable by the residence country. Further suppose the 
source country characterizes the income as compensation from 
personal services, in which case it is rightly subject to taxation 
by the source country under the treaty. This produces a conflict, 
which the treaties do not resolve.86 
Double taxation may also occur because the treaties do not 
contain a uniform and ascertainable definition of “covered 
taxes,” or the taxes for which the treaty country must provide 
relief from double taxation. In the U.S. Model Treaty, for in-
stance, Article 2 states that the treaty applies to “Federal income 
taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code” and also covers 
“identical or substantially similar taxes that are imposed after 
the date of [the signing of the treaty] in addition to, or in place 
of, the existing taxes.”87 The term “covered taxes” is notoriously 
difficult to interpret and, in recent years, has become the subject 
of intense debate.88  
 
 85. Id. at 168. 
 86. See Boulez v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 584, 589 (1984) (holding that payments 
to a music conductor were compensation for services—a category that did not 
get benefits under the relevant treaty—rather than royalties, which would have 
been tax-free under the treaty). The U.S. Model Treaty provides that if a term 
is not defined by the treaty, then the country that is applying the treaty should 
use its tax law to supply the term’s meaning, “unless the context otherwise re-
quires.” U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 3(2). One interpretation of Ar-
ticle 3(2) is that only the source state can invoke it since it is the one typically 
applying the treaty. Avery Jones, supra note 1, at 18. The residence state, how-
ever, could take the position that it should apply its domestic laws in interpret-
ing whether it must give relief for double taxation. Id. In such cases, double 
taxation might ensue. Id. 
 87. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 2. 
 88. See Fadi Shaheen, Income Tax Treaty Aspects of Nonincome Taxes: The 
Importance of Residence, 71 TAX L. REV. 583, 607, 609–10, 612–14 (2018); Rich-
ard S. Collier & Michael P. Devereux, The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax 
and Double Tax Treaties 7 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper 
No. 17/06, 2017), https://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/6808/1/WP1706.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/DU37-CSMC]. Most recently, whether the new BEAT, enacted in the 2017 
U.S. tax legislation, falls within the scope of Article 2 has become an area of live 
concern given that regime’s only partial creditability of foreign tax credits. See 
infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
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Avoidance of double taxation is also often not achieved be-
cause transactions involve jurisdictions beyond those mentioned 
in the tax treaties.89 Moreover, treaties address only “juridical 
rather than economic double taxation,” thereby allowing some 
double taxation to occur.90  
Tax treaties could resolve many of the above such matters, 
but the treaty language is often very general and its structure 
interstitial. This lack of specificity and comprehensiveness is 
most certainly a conscious choice by the treaty parties, who are 
reluctant to grant double tax relief in close cases. For the most 
part, these are precisely the cases not granted relief under do-
mestic law, and so one is left to wonder what tax treaties accom-
plish that is not already achieved under the domestic law.  
3. Double Taxation as Red Herring 
Even if tax treaties were necessary to avoid double taxation, 
it is unclear whether that goal should be pursued. To achieve 
double taxation relief would require more complete coordination, 
which may be undesirable given the centrality of taxation to the 
governmental function. As Daniel Shaviro has argued outside of 
the treaty context, nations may be reluctant to forfeit their inde-
pendence in this area.91 Additionally, defining source “correctly” 
is, in many contexts, a fool’s errand: economically speaking, mul-
tiple and overlapping jurisdictions generate income.92 Finally, 
Shaviro argues that the principle of taxing all income once will 
 
 89. See EMILY FETT, TRIANGULAR CASES: THE APPLICATION OF BILATERAL 
INCOME TAX TREATIES IN MULTILATERAL SITUATIONS 20 (2014); Ruth Mason, 
U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Justice, 59 TAX L. REV. 65, 
113–14 (2005). 
 90. Yariv Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 973, 986 (2016); see also Wei Cui, Minimalism About Residence and Source, 
38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 245, 266–67 (2017) (arguing that the focus on double taxa-
tion overlooks the economic incidence of taxes). Juridical double taxation is 
when the same taxpayer has to pay tax twice on the same income. FETT, supra 
note 89, at 60. Economic double taxation occurs when different taxpayers have 
to pay tax twice on the same income. Id.  
 91. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 113. 
 92. Id.; see also Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International 
Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 30 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990) (con-
tending that “source” lacks economic foundation). But see Mitchell A. Kane, A 
Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 311, 323 
(2015) (defending the coherence of source rules although not necessarily on eco-
nomic grounds).  
  
2020] UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY 1775 
 
likely not enhance global efficiency.93 This is because countries 
vary in their tax rates; therefore, taxing income once, and only 
once, does not yield any locational neutrality in investment de-
cisions.94 Instead, taxpayers will decide where to conduct activ-
ity based on where the lowest tax rate can be obtained.95 In the 
real world, because of differences in tax regimes, double taxation 
of income may even increase global efficiency, if, for instance, 
this would create neutrality between a taxpayer facing a 40% 
rate in Country A versus a 20% rate in Country B.96 
Shaviro, however, goes on to conclude that the avoidance of 
double taxation may nonetheless be a worthy goal of bilateral 
tax treaties if the treaty countries have the same tax rates and 
equal cross-border capital flows.97 In that situation, the avoid-
ance of double taxation creates economic surplus by establishing 
neutrality between single-country and cross-country income.98 
Because the countries are similarly situated, the concessions 
made by Country A in the above example in forgoing taxation of 
Country B’s residents are balanced by Country B’s similar con-
cessions regarding its own residents.99  
In reality, however, it is extremely unlikely that the two 
countries will be identically situated, both in tax rates and in-
vestment flows.100 This is especially true over time.101 Moreover, 
even if such homogeneity exists, the existence of tax havens cre-
ates imbalance between the two countries since it is likely that 
one country’s rules allow for more or less income-shifting to such 
havens.102 It is thus unclear what goal the avoidance of double 
taxation is serving, even in the treaty context. Indeed, the het-
erogeneity of treaty countries may explain the above observa-
 
 93. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 114.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 115.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. See Elke Asen, Corporate Tax Rates Around the World, 2019, TAX 
FOUND. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/publications/corporate-tax 
-rates-around-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/QQ6N-HBFM] (examining global tax 
rate data). 
 101. See id. (discussing global tax rate changes since 1980). 
 102. SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 115–16.  
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tion—that treaties do not in fact ameliorate double taxation. Do-
ing so would serve no efficiency goal nor would it be of equal de-
sirability to each country.  
Another recent debate in the academic literature exposes 
what little work the concept of double taxation accomplishes in 
the treaty network. Recent proposals to reform the U.S. interna-
tional tax system deviate from the model of full creditability of 
foreign taxes under a worldwide system.103 Shaviro, for instance, 
has proposed a reduced rate for foreign source business income 
and the allowance of a deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign 
taxes paid.104 Part of Shaviro’s rationale stems from the conclu-
sion that the foreign tax credit’s 100% marginal reimbursement 
rate (MRR) problematically makes taxpayers insensitive to for-
eign tax rates.105 This insensitivity is against the national inter-
est because the U.S. government ends up footing the bill for 
higher taxes abroad. Shaviro’s approach is similar to other pro-
posals, such as Option Z and that of the former Obama admin-
istration.106 It also has been partially implemented in the 2017 
legislation through the GILTI regime, which allows foreign tax 
credits of only 80%.107  
It is an open issue whether these proposals or the GILTI re-
gime comply with Article 23 of the treaties, but there is a per-
suasive argument that incarnations of them do.108 Historically, 
the foreign tax credit has reduced tax liability dollar for dollar.109 
Fadi Shaheen argues, however, that it is acceptable to divide a 
 
 103. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Foreign Tax Creditability, 63 
NAT’L TAX J. 709, 710 (2010) (arguing for deductibility of foreign source income 
rather than full creditability); see also Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Tax-
ing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 570 (2003) (reaching 
similar conclusions for foreign taxes on passive income). 
 104. Shaviro, supra note 103. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Shaviro himself notes these similarities. See Daniel Shaviro, Response 
to Comments on Fixing U.S. International Taxation, 9 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL 
STUD. 132, 140–41 (2014) [hereinafter Shaviro, Response]; Daniel Shaviro, The 
Crossroads Versus the Seesaw: Getting a “Fix” on Recent International Tax Pol-
icy Developments, 69 TAX L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2015) [hereinafter Shaviro, Cross-
roads]. 
 107. 26 U.S.C. § 960(d)(1) (2018). 
 108. Article 23 requires either exemption or a credit for foreign taxes. U.S. 
MODEL TREATY supra note 32, art. 23.  
 109. Shaviro, Response, supra note 106, at 709. 
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dollar of foreign source income and allow credits on only a por-
tion of the dollar so long as the other portion is exempted.110 Op-
tion Z would have followed this approach explicitly, providing 
that foreign source income was 60% taxable with foreign tax 
credits and 40% exempt.111 Shaheen’s argument is that, under 
both the U.S. and OECD model treaties, these types of proposals 
are treaty-compliant so long as the exempt piece and the cred-
itable piece of the income add up to at least 100%.112 GILTI is a 
variation of this approach, albeit more generous, since it is tax-
ing only 50% of foreign source income while allowing foreign tax 
credits for 80% of foreign taxes paid.113 
Mitchell Kane agrees with Shaheen’s general conclusion 
that, so long as the income can be separated into exempt and 
creditable portions, a mixture of these two approaches is treaty-
compliant.114 Kane goes further to add that treaties prevent the 
resident country from causing its residents’ foreign source in-
come to be taxed at a higher rate than domestic source income 
(taking into account both countries’ taxes).115 This means that if 
the source country imposes a higher tax than the residence coun-
try, then the residence country cannot impose any residence-
based tax. If the source country taxes at a lower rate, then the 
residence country can tax the shortfall, but only up to its rate on 
domestic source income. 
Drawing upon League of Nations documents, Kane argues 
that double taxation does not really mean double taxation.116 In-
stead, in the treaty sense, the relevant inquiry is simply whether 
the overall tax burden exceeds what would have been imposed 
by the residence country on domestic source income.117 Tax trea-
ties, in other words, are about capping rates rather than double 
taxation per se. In pursuing this goal, they strive towards a par-
ticular result rather than a particular method.118  
 
 110. Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties?, 41 BROOK. 
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Under this framework, what obligation to credit foreign 
taxes does the residence country have when it imposes a lower 
rate on foreign source income than it does on domestic source 
income? Kane admits this is a question that the treaty drafters 
did not specifically contemplate, but using the above framework, 
this set of facts should reduce the burden of juridical double tax-
ation and the corresponding obligation arising under Article 
23.119 In such cases, Kane reasons that a partial credit, rather 
than a dollar for dollar credit, will satisfy Article 23 so long as 
the overall tax burden does not exceed that imposed on domestic 
source income.120  
Both Kane’s and Shaheen’s analysis seem to suggest that 
Article 23’s central concern is aggregate tax burden rather than 
the method of double tax relief, albeit Kane’s conclusion is more 
explicit in this regard. If double taxation seems like a norma-
tively empty goal, does aggregate tax burden fare any better? It 
would seem, after all, that investors care about the overall level 
of tax they are paying rather than whether income is technically 
taxed once, twice, or multiple times. Double taxation could lead 
to better tax results than single taxation, if, for instance, two 
countries imposed a 10% tax and a single country imposed a 30% 
tax on an item of income.  
It seems rational, then, that countries should care more 
about overall taxation rather than double taxation. It also seems 
in the countries’ interest to preserve a mixture of double tax re-
lief methods, as Kane concludes.121 From the perspective of the 
residence country, worldwide taxation with full foreign tax credit 
relief cuts off tax competition since the source country cannot set 
the tax burden on the foreign source income.122 In contrast, un-
der an exemption system, the source country can do so.123 But 
the former system also makes its investors insensitive to local 
tax rates and may overly burden its residents. From the perspec-
tive of the source country, it may prefer residence country ex-
emption since it gets to set the tax rates, however, the source 
country may also enjoy the ability to increase revenues without 
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the foreign resident facing an increased tax burden, as is possi-
ble under the credit system.124  
In Kane’s view, both residence and source countries would 
prefer a treaty that preserves policy mixture so that they can 
balance these various and competing goals, rather than a system 
that forces them into pure credit or pure exemption ap-
proaches.125 And, under Kane’s view, the former system is indeed 
what we have.126 Kane is likely right that a hybrid approach to 
international taxation makes the most sense strategically and 
indeed is reflected in the treaties and nearly all international tax 
systems. But a further question arises as to whether the treaty 
is doing any work here.  
If it is in the unilateral interest of both nations to have a 
mixed system, then that is likely what will arise without tax 
treaties. Indeed, the flexibility of the treaties, as interpreted by 
Kane and Shaheen, means that neither nation has settled upon 
which degree of rate competition versus revenue collection they 
would prefer, instead leaving it up to the domestic policies of the 
residence country. The source country, in other words, remains 
beholden to the policy choices of the treaty partner.  
One concession that the source country does obtain, at least 
under Kane’s view, is that overall taxation will be capped at the 
residence country’s tax rate on domestic source income.127 
Query, however, whether this is any sort of meaningful promise. 
Overall taxation still depends on the domestic rates of the resi-
dence country; nothing in the treaty prevents very high taxation 
so long as the residence country also imposes such rates on do-
mestic source income. There are political and practical con-
straints, however, on the ability of the residence country to tax 
foreign source income more heavily than domestic source in-
come.  
In fact, it is generally the opposite that we worry about—
that foreign source income goes undertaxed by the residence 
country. This outcome results because there are convincing rea-
sons a residence country would prefer to more lightly tax foreign 
source income than domestic source income.128 While location-
specific rents, as well as a robust labor market, might support a 
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high U.S. tax rate on domestic source income, such factors likely 
do not support taxation of foreign source income at the same lev-
els.129 In other words, it is efficient for a country to tax foreign 
source income at a lower rate than domestic source income be-
cause it can exercise its market power more with respect to the 
latter, thereby making the former more tax-elastic.130 On the 
other hand, the residence country should prefer to impose some 
degree of taxation on a resident company’s foreign source income 
since doing so discourages profit-shifting and also brings in rev-
enues.131 
Perhaps because of this balancing act, every tax system uni-
laterally seems to tax foreign source income of resident compa-
nies more lightly than domestic source income.132 In the old 
worldwide system, the United States’ tolerance of deferral effec-
tively created a disparity in the rates on domestic and foreign 
source income, favoring the latter.133 Under the new system, that 
choice is more explicit, with foreign source income obtaining a 
50% deduction.134 And in pure territorial systems, active foreign 
source income is exempt.135 Thus, it seems that this purported 
goal for tax treaties—to constrain the top rate residence coun-
tries can impose on foreign source income—would likely be 
achieved in the absence of the treaties. Although Kane and Sha-
heen’s careful work is helpful in detailing how tax treaties can 
accommodate partial creditability of foreign taxes, we have yet 
to find a good reason for tax treaties in the first place.  
In short, without the concept of double taxation as a guide 
for setting jurisdictional limits, there does not seem to be any 
basis to have strict reciprocity of rates through a bilateral solu-
tion. Domestic legislation could instead achieve lower withhold-
ing rates. Reciprocity, as a goal of tax treaties, comes under fur-
ther scrutiny when one examines the asymmetry of investment 
flows and tax systems, as discussed below.136 
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B. THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION 
The other stated purpose of tax treaties is the prevention of 
fiscal evasion.137 Traditionally, this rationale supported the ex-
change of relevant information. Article 26, which implements 
this principle, however, is ineffective. In both the U.S. and 
OECD Model Treaties, a party does not have to provide infor-
mation which “is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal 
course of the administration” or which “would disclose any trade, 
business, industrial, commercial, or professional secret or trade 
process.”138 For many years, countries like Luxembourg and 
Switzerland took the position that these carve-outs specifically 
allowed bank secrecy to trump information exchange.139 
More generally, a treaty is an odd mechanism to induce 
banking havens to share information. The United States may 
care very deeply about wanting information from a banking ha-
ven, but there is no reciprocal desire on the haven’s side.140 They 
therefore have no incentive to fulfill their agreement.141 Moreo-
ver, when evasion spans multiple countries, the bilateral format 
of the income tax treaty does little to solve the problem.142 
To the extent exchange of information by international 
agreement is desirable, there are other means to achieve it. Tax 
information exchange agreements (TIEAs), based on a 2002 
OECD model agreement, allow countries to exchange infor-
mation on taxpayers without also reallocating taxing jurisdic-
tion.143 In their first decade, over 500 TIEAs were signed.144 
 
 137. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32 (entitling the treaty as “for 
the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of tax evasion”). 
 138. Id. art. 26(3); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 30, art. 26(3). 
 139. Lee A. Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Part 4: Ineffectual Information 
Sharing, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 1139, 1142 (2009). 
 140. Id. at 1140. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS (2002), https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of 
-tax-information/2082215.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7G3-AK6P]. 
 144. Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/ 
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Newer tools, like domestic legislation and implementing bilat-
eral agreements, can also be used to yield information exchange. 
In 2010, for instance, the United States enacted the Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to stop tax evasion by its 
residents.145 FATCA requires foreign banks and financial insti-
tutions to provide information on U.S. taxpayers and their finan-
cial accounts.146 The novel feature of FATCA is a 30% withhold-
ing tax on U.S. source income paid to taxpayers that have not 
provided information regarding their residency or identity of 
their owners.147 
FATCA requirements, in most cases, violated the financial 
institutions’ countries’ internal laws.148 Intergovernmental 
agreements (IGAs) became necessary to implement FATCA.149 
According to the U.S. Treasury, the United States has agreed to 
113 IGAs since 2010.150 Subsequent to FATCA, the OECD devel-
oped the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) based on the 
IGAs.151 The CRS is an automatic information exchange, which 
over 100 countries have agreed to implement, and allows other 
countries to implement FATCA-like obligations with non-U.S. 
counterparties.152  
Clearly, FATCA has been a watershed act and, along with 
the rise of other instruments, calls into question the continuing 
 
 145. Though initially introduced as a separate bill, the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act was passed as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employ-
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relevance of Article 26. Although IGAs, in their current form, 
lack reciprocal commitments by the United States, IGAs have 
done much to eliminate bank secrecy worldwide and have also 
influenced a global information exchange network. The infor-
mation exchange world has clearly moved beyond double income 
tax treaties. 
That being said, because IGAs were entered into outside of 
the Article II treaty process, the executive branch asserted their 
legality by characterizing them as add-ons to existing tax trea-
ties.153 If the United States jettisoned the information exchange 
provisions in the treaties (which I do not recommend), then this 
could jeopardize the legality of the IGAs. Even if this was the 
case, however, there are additional arguments supporting the le-
gality of the IGAs on a standalone basis, either as binding ad-
ministrative guidance or as congressional-executive agree-
ments.154 
There is, however, an additional concern that if the jurisdic-
tional provisions of the treaties are unwound, then political econ-
omy considerations will also lead to less support of the infor-
mation exchange provisions. Under this view, taxpayers tolerate 
information exchange only because they are receiving relief of 
source country taxation in exchange. I am somewhat dubious of 
this account. In fact, the reverse dynamic has been present. Un-
til recently, the information exchange requirements jeopardized 
the United States’ entrance into new tax treaties, with Senator 
Rand Paul blocking action on the treaties for almost a decade out 
of protest of FATCA.155 Information exchange has proliferated 
and evolved into a strong norm in the international arena, and 
the FATCA regime thus far has withstood strong pressure 
against it. If this concern remains, however, the jurisdictional 
provisions could be weakened but not eliminated, which I discuss 
in Part V below.156 
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C. DOUBLE NON-TAXATION 
In accordance with the BEPS plan, the purpose of treaties 
has since grown to encompass the principle of double non-taxa-
tion, supporting devices like limitation on benefits provisions 
and the unilateral override provisions in the new U.S. Model 
Treaty.157 Although these developments combat treaty abuse 
and double non-taxation, they are effectively solving problems 
created, in part, by the treaties themselves. Therefore, they can-
not be invoked to justify the existence of tax treaties, as will be 
explained below.  
What is double non-taxation and why is it problematic? Af-
ter all, almost every type of taxation distorts economic activity, 
so should not less taxation assist in the free movement of capi-
tal? Double non-taxation generally means income that is other-
wise typically taxed in one jurisdiction ends up being taxed no-
where. The phenomenon is sometimes referred to in the 
literature as stateless income or homeless income.158 The OECD 
describes double non-taxation as leading to “a reduction of the 
overall tax paid by all parties involved as a whole, which harms 
competition, economic efficiency, transparency and fairness.”159 
One primary concern with double non-taxation is the creation of 
a race to the bottom, whereby all jurisdictions are worse off due 
to tax competition.160 Another concern is the preference of cross-
border income as contrasted with wholly domestic income, a con-
cern expressed in the state aid cases.161  
Resolving the phenomena is difficult as a conceptual matter 
because the problem results from the sovereignty of countries 
over their own tax systems. Since tax treaties, in their current 
incarnation, never require taxation of income but instead func-
tion as devices that limit taxing jurisdiction, it is unclear how 
they can ever solve the problem of double non-taxation. Instead, 
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tax treaties tend to create double non-taxation because they al-
low taxpayers to combine reduced treaty rates on source-based 
withholding taxes with favorable domestic tax rules.162 In order 
to fix double non-taxation, domestic law must be utilized, and, 
at best, tax treaties may be designed to not make the situation 
worse.163  
What features of tax treaties, then, give rise to double non-
taxation? This stems from the grand bargain struck between 
source and residence countries, with the residence countries ob-
taining the right to tax “residual income” after a minimal 
amount of income has been allocated to the source country.164 As 
Bret Wells and Cym H. Lowell have stated, “Our treaties were 
premised on the concept of allocating income to prevent double 
taxation, but the result is that they have achieved double non-
taxation.”165 The two demonstrate that the phenomenon of dou-
ble non-taxation arises from the League of Nations’ choice to 
adopt a residence-based approach rather than one based on 
profit-splitting.166  
The question that the tax treaties were originally trying to 
resolve was how to allocate income between a parent company, 
typically located in a mercantilist country like England (the “res-
idence” country, in today’s terminology), and its supply, manu-
facturing, and shipping subsidiaries, typically located in British 
Commonwealth countries like India (the “source” country).167 
The subsidiaries would pay “base erosion payments,” such as 
royalties, service fees, and leasehold payments to the parent, 
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which would be deductible against their colonial income tax.168 
In this manner, residual profits were stripped out of the source 
country, leaving it only the ability to tax routine profits.169  
Under these facts, the income is being taxed by the mercan-
tilist country. With the interposition of a holding company situ-
ated in a tax haven, however, the residual profits could be shifted 
to a jurisdiction that does not tax such income through base ero-
sion payments. Although the colonial country could assert that 
the arm’s length principle allocates it a certain portion of the 
profit, typically transfer pricing methods are limited to the in-
come that should be received by the source country, thereby fail-
ing to police the income allocated to the holding company.170 As 
Wells and Lowell note, this planning strategy primarily stems 
from several elements bound up in the tax treaty framework: (1) 
the decision to allocate residual income to the residence country, 
with the source country only taxing local operations, (2) the in-
terposition of a holding company that is not treated as a perma-
nent establishment and is entitled to receive residual income 
(and thereby treated as situated in the residence country), and 
(3) the deployment of one-sided transfer pricing.171  
In pursuing the approach ultimately adopted by the League 
of Nations treaty, the four economists were aware of the danger 
that holding companies in tax havens posed.172 They recognized 
that such subsidiaries allowed the allocation of income to a coun-
try that was neither a source or residence country, thus creating 
the potential for electivity into a low-taxed regime.173 Perhaps, 
though, they glossed over these concerns because they assumed 
the residence country would ultimately find ways to tax such in-
come. As it turns out, however, income shifted to holding compa-
nies has gone largely untaxed by residence countries.174 Tax 
competition has spurred residence countries in this direction, 
less they face expatriation by their multinational corporations to 
a country that does not tax such income.175 
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For instance, even under its former worldwide system, the 
United States allowed deferral on income allocated to subsidiar-
ies in tax havens.176 Although various outbound regimes (such 
as controlled foreign corporation rules) and inbound regimes 
(such as earnings-stripping and thin capitalization rules) have 
attempted to tax such income, tax competition has also caused 
countries to rationally tolerate profit shifting.177 Arguably, the 
new tax regime instituted by the United States, with BEAT and 
GILTI, will strengthen taxation of previously untaxed earnings. 
In previous work, however, I have argued that the new law 
largely keeps base erosion and profit shifting incentives in-
tact.178 Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 
that nearly 80% of profit shifting is maintained under the new 
regime.179 The effect on profit shifting is likely even smaller, 
since CBO does not take into account investor reactions to the 
instability of the FDII regime in response to WTO challenges, 
investor reactions to the political instability of the legislation in 
general, and tax competition from other countries.180 Further-
more, commentators and treaty partners have critiqued the new 
provisions for violating the tax treaties.181 As a result, U.S. law-
makers may face future pressures to curtail the regimes on a bi-
lateral basis.  
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Tax treaties, however, do seem to be inching closer to ad-
dressing double non-taxation.182 As stated in the official press 
release of the new model treaty, the U.S. Treasury has taken the 
position that tax treaties should eliminate double taxation “with-
out creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation 
through tax evasion or avoidance.”183 To further this relatively 
modest goal, the new model treaty contains somewhat unique 
“kill-switch” provisions that turn off treaty benefits if income is 
subject to low or no taxation abroad.184 For instance, the special 
tax regime provisions deny treaty benefits on deductible interest 
or royalties to related persons that face low or no taxation under 
a preferential tax regime.185 In this manner, the rules preserve 
source taxation when the residence country forgoes taxation of 
the item of income. The treaty also provides that treaty benefits 
relating to dividends, interest, royalties, and other income may 
be denied if a treaty partner either (a) reduces its tax rates to 
below the lesser of 15% of 60% of the general statutory rate or 
(b) switches to a territorial regime.186 Other changes to both the 
U.S. and OECD model treaties attempt to minimize double non-
taxation.187 These changes include addressing exempt perma-
nent establishments, revisions to the limitation on benefits pro-
visions, rules on expatriated entities, and the new general anti-
abuse rule adopted in the multilateral instrument.188 
Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued that the international tax re-
gime embraces a principle that income should be taxed once and 
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only once.189 He has pointed to these recent treaty developments 
as further indication that the world is converging upon this “sin-
gle tax principle.”190 Ample room for double non-taxation under 
the treaties still exists, however. There is much uncertainty as 
to the definition of what constitutes a “special tax regime” if such 
regimes are not explicitly identified during the treaty negotia-
tions. Moreover, if such a regime is implemented through admin-
istrative practice, the United States might not be able to detect 
it if it cannot access taxpayer-specific rulings.191  
Finally, it is the treaty regime and its fundamental bargain 
between source and residence countries that is a primary cause 
of a great deal of double non-taxation. That treaty partners are 
now undoing some of the treaties’ contribution to double non-
taxation through mechanisms like the unilateral override and 
anti-abuse provisions cannot be seen as justification for the trea-
ties. 
D. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Increased foreign direct investment (FDI) is another cited 
reason for tax treaties.192 We would expect foreign direct invest-
ment to increase upon entrance into a tax treaty for two reasons. 
First, if tax treaties really do alleviate double taxation, then we 
 
 189. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay 
on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 305, 309 (2014) 
(“The single tax principle states that income should be subject to tax only once, 
and thus rejects both double taxation and double non-taxation.”); see also Hugh 
J. Ault, Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax 
Principles, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 1195, 1195 (2013) (noting that the League of 
Nations advocated a scheme in which income is taxed “once and only once”).  
 190. Avi-Yonah & Mazzoni, supra note 182, at 3. This principle has been 
controversial both descriptively and as a normative goal. Rosenbloom, supra 
note 163, at 166 (stating that “[i]nvoking the international tax system does not 
constitute an explanation, since that system appears to be imaginary”); see also 
SHAVIRO, supra note 5, at 21; Graetz, supra note 5, at 270 n.29 (citing Rosen-
bloom, supra note 163); Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S61, S71 (2002) (same).  
 191. Christians & Ezenagu, supra note 157, at 1075; Ruth Mason, Identify-
ing Illegal Subsidies, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 515–16 (2019) (discussing use of 
secret administrative rulings as a method to confer illegal subsidies to private 
companies).  
 192. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 108 n.88 (providing an excellent summary of 
the literature on FDI and tax treaties). 
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would expect foreign direct investment between the two coun-
tries to increase.193 Second, the treaties may enhance the treaty 
country’s reputation among the global economy, a benefit that 
would expand as the country’s treaty network expands.194 
Empirical evidence on whether tax treaties bring in foreign 
direct investment, however, is mixed.195 Several older studies 
looked at changes in FDI on a jurisdictional basis as countries 
entered into tax treaties and concluded that there was no in-
crease in FDI.196 Newer studies have looked at whether a greater 
number of tax treaties is correlated with higher FDI and have 
found a positive relationship between the two.197 It is difficult to 
confirm causation, however, “since treaties may precede invest-
ment not because they spur the latter but because they may be 
concluded only when there is an expectation of such invest-
ment.”198 In the United States, for instance, this is a built-in fea-
ture of treaty policy.199 
 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. See Paul L. Baker, An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and Their 
Effect on Foreign Direct Investment, 21 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 341, 362 (2014) (find-
ing no effect on FDI flows); Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, Do Bilateral 
Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 
526 (E. Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan eds., 2005) (finding a positive effect on 
FDI from old treaties but a slight negative effect from new treaties); Bruce A. 
Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI 
Activity, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 601, 602 (2004) (same); Ronald B. Davies, Tax 
Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential Versus Performance, 11 INT’L 
TAX & PUB. FIN. 775, 784 (2004) (finding no effect on FDI from U.S. treaties); 
Peter Egger et al., The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Direct 
Investment: Theory and Evidence, 39 CAN. J. ECON. 901, 902 (2006) (finding a 
negative effect on FDI); Eric Neumayer, Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase 
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 43 J. DEV. STUD. 1501, 1502 
(2007) (finding some effect in attracting FDI, but only in limited circumstances). 
 196. See, e.g., Blonigen & Davies, supra note 195; Davies, supra note 195, at 
776; Egger et al., supra note 195, at 921–24. 
 197. Julian di Giovanni, What Drives Capital Flows? The Case of Cross-Bor-
der M&A Activity and Financial Deepening, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 127, 145 (2005) 
(demonstrating how “capital tax treaties increase M&A activity”); Neumayer, 
supra note 195, at 1515 (examining how tax treatises “fulfill the purpose of at-
tracting FDI”).  
 198. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 77, at 26.  
 199. Id.  
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One other study has reached both conclusions.200 It finds 
that the number of treaties that a source country has signed with 
the United States is positively correlated with FDI from the 
United States, while also concluding that there is a negative cor-
relation between new and existing treaties with the United 
States and such FDI.201 One explanation for this is that a large 
network of treaties increases profit shifting through the source 
country by means of treaty shopping.202 On the other hand, new 
and existing treaties that are renegotiated may reduce FDI and 
reinvested earnings because of the information sharing and tax 
cooperation features of tax treaties.203  
The FDI effect is likely to be particularly muted in the case 
of developed countries like the United States since the treaty is 
not needed to signal regime stability to investors in that context. 
Moreover, if tax treaties are increasing FDI because of treaty 
shopping, developed countries may not benefit from that effect 
given the relatively higher rates of taxation imposed by such 
countries.  
Furthermore, investment in the United States may also be 
more inelastic than other jurisdictions. This may be the case if 
demand for U.S. assets is strong enough to support withhold-
ing.204 For instance, although the United States taxes real prop-
erty, foreign ownership of U.S. real assets remains robust.205 The 
strong U.S. market for goods and services may mean that foreign 
demand could support higher withholding rates on outbound 
flows.206  
 
 200. Joseph P. Daniels et al., Bilateral Tax Treaties and US Foreign Direct 
Investment Financing Modes, 22 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 999, 1025–26 (2015). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 1025.  
 204. Driessen, supra note 44, at 749 (“However, investment in the United 
States may be more inelastic than commonly is perceived—that is, demand by 
foreign persons for U.S. assets is strong enough that increases in U.S. withhold-
ing on outbound flows may not make much difference in a foreign person’s deci-
sion to invest.”).  
 205. Id. at 749 n.25 (“FIRPTA does not seem to have curbed the demand by 
foreign persons for U.S. residential and other real property.”).  
 206. Id. (“[T]he sizable U.S. market for goods and services likely is important 
enough to [foreign owners] that higher U.S. withholding rates on outbound 
flows from inbound FDI might not discourage inbound FDI very much.”).  
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Although the U.S. statutory withholding rate of 30% is quite 
high,207 the portfolio interest exemption and availability of de-
rivatives drastically reduce the number of taxpayers subject to 
the tax.208 In this sense, the reduced treaty rates do little work. 
If treaties did not exist, then surely the domestic withholding 
rate would be set much lower, thereby alleviating concerns of 
over-taxation. In all likelihood, the reason that the 30% rate has 
held so long is that it is a way for the United States to preserve 
its negotiating position in the treaty context.209 Some would ar-
gue that using the domestic rate as leverage is valuable, and 
thus the treaties allow the United States to tailor their policy-
making to their relationship with particular countries. As I ex-
plore throughout the Article, however, our monolithic negotiat-
ing positions mute this benefit, and, in any case, domestic law 
could be used to achieve similar results. For instance, the statu-
tory withholding rate could be applicable to certain countries 
with whom we have diplomatic relationships or that meet other 
enumerated criteria.210 
E. COMITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Related to the issue of increased foreign direct investment, 
it is also posited that countries enter into tax treaties for comity 
reasons.211 Tax treaties solidify relationships between countries 
and create communication channels between their taxing au-
thorities.212 For developing countries especially, entering into 
 
 207. See IRS, WITHHOLDING OF TAX (2020). 
 208. See David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 
456–57 (1996) (noting the impact of exemptions and derivatives on the market).  
 209. Jones, supra note 1, at 3 (“The reason why treaties do not lead to har-
monization of tax law is . . . the need to preserve one’s negotiating position.”). 
 210. For instance, under current law, the foreign tax credit is denied for 
taxes paid to countries with whom we have severed diplomatic relations. See 26 
U.S.C. § 901(j)(2)(a)(ii) (2018) (“This subsection shall apply to any foreign coun-
try . . . with respect to which the United States has severed diplomatic rela-
tions.”).  
 211. Christians, supra note 1, at 706–07 (“It has been suggested that tax 
treaties may signal a stable investment and business climate in which treaty 
partners express their dedication to protecting and fostering foreign invest-
ment . . . . [T]ax treaties may serve largely to signal that a country is willing to 
adopt the international norms regarding trade and investment, and hence, that 
the country is a safe place to invest.” (citations and quotations omitted)).  
 212. Brauner, supra note 90, at 988 (comparing international tax treatises 
to membership cards that “emphasize their role as comity mechanisms”). 
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the “club” of tax treaties improves a nation’s standing in the in-
ternational arena, serving as a “stamp of approval.”213 Signing a 
tax treaty signals that the country “is willing to adopt the inter-
national norms,” which may have positive effects in non-tax ar-
eas as well.214 
Although such benefits might accrue to a developing country 
attempting to gain a seat at the table, they are less likely to sway 
the position of the United States, whose existing trade relation-
ships and agreements with other countries dwarf the impact of 
tax treaties. Moreover, an established tax administration that is 
willing to robustly enforce tax norms, like the IRS, produces a 
more effective signaling effect to other nations.215 Comity consid-
erations should therefore be relatively minor in factoring into 
the decision of whether the United States should enter into tax 
treaties. 
F. CERTAINTY AND PREDICTABILITY 
Tax treaties are also said to signify a stable and certain legal 
regime. Many would argue that the current international tax re-
gime is fairly harmonized, and this is partly due to the existence 
of the treaty network.216 The OECD Model has been incredibly 
influential, and the more than 3000 tax treaties in existence are 
based upon it.217 One scholar has noted that, “[o]ne can pick up 
any modern tax treaty and immediately find one’s way around, 
often even down to the article number.”218 As a result, tax trea-
ties are quite similar to one another.  
To the extent that standardization of international tax rules 
has occurred, however, we see it outside of the tax treaty context 
 
 213. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 113.  
 214. Vann, supra note 1, at 726. 
 215. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 167–68 (discussing the importance of 
“robust legislation” as an important signal to other countries). 
 216. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Does Customary International Tax Law 
Exist? (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Se-
ries, Paper No. 640, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3382203 (examining the harmonization of the current international tax re-
gime and customary international law). 
 217. See Yariv Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, Introduction to BRICS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 3 n.4 (Yariv Brauner & 
Pasquale Pistone eds., 2015) (“[The international tax regime] is constructed 
around the network of bilateral tax treatises, essentially all of which are mod-
elled on the OECD convention.” (citations and quotations omitted)).  
 218. Jones, supra note 1, at 2.  
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as well—in the domestic laws of nations.219 For instance, in the 
United States, a foreign person will be taxed on U.S. business 
income if it is “effectively connected” to a “U.S. trade or busi-
ness.” Tax treaties attempt to clarify and harmonize this concept 
by narrowing source country jurisdiction over “business profits” 
that are “attributable to a permanent establishment.”220 The 
treaty standard, however, appears to be no clearer than the do-
mestic one, causing many to conclude that it is essentially equiv-
alent to the domestic standard.221 Indeed, some of the U.S. tax 
treaties explicitly define the term “business profits” in a way that 
references the domestic law.222 The Internal Revenue Service 
has drawn upon domestic law to interpret what constitutes a 
“permanent establishment,” referencing concepts that are also 
used to determine the domestic standard.223 This is the case for 
other treaty terms as well.224 
As stated earlier, the treaties generally defer to domestic 
law to answer vexing and central questions as to the residency 
of the taxpayer, what type of income is at issue, and the defini-
tion of income taxes.225 Tax treaties are primarily jurisdictional 
devices and “mostly lack operative provisions of law” that would 
more meaningfully harmonize the tax regimes of various na-
tions.226 Even as jurisdictional devices, however, the treaties 
 
 219. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage, and the In-
ternational Tax Regime, 61 BULL. INT’L TAX’N, no. 4, 2007, at 130 (contending 
that a coherent international tax regime exists in both tax treaties and the do-
mestic law of all nations).  
 220. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 7, at 15. 
 221. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Why Do We Need Treaties?, 68 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 783 (2012); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Oz Halabi, Double or Nothing: A Tax 
Treaty for the 21st Century 1–2 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working 
Papers, Paper No. 66, 2012), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1176&context=law_econ_current.  
 222. Allison Christians & Yariv Brauner, United States, in 7 THE MEANING 
OF “ENTERPRISE,” “BUSINESS” AND “BUSINESS PROFITS” UNDER TAX TREATIES 
AND EU TAX LAW 591–93 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2011). 
 223. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1413–14. 
 224. Christians & Brauner, supra note 222, at 601 (“In general, the terms 
‘business, enterprise, and business profits’ as used in the U.S. tax treaties are 
not autonomous but derive their meaning from domestic tax law provisions.”).  
 225. See supra Part II.C; see also Kysar, supra note 47, at 1411–12 (noting 
that “specific treaty provisions dictate that domestic law applies when defining 
a term”). 
 226. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1411. 
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merely “state general taxing principles” whereas “[c]ode provi-
sions are tailored to specific situations.”227  
The extent to which tax treaties harmonize international 
law is thus limited. This may be due to various reasons. For one, 
tax law is an area of law that has to address “nearly all economic 
activities” and encompasses all business entities and individu-
als, all while aiming to meet “critical revenue-raising and redis-
tribution functions.”228 Given the complexities of these tasks, an 
intricate body of domestic law has arisen. Even still, the statu-
tory text does not often address the specific fact pattern in ques-
tion and thus reliance upon non-textual sources is necessary to 
fill interpretive gaps.229 Plain meaning interpretation also often 
seems inappropriate in the tax setting given the self-containing 
nature of tax law, which creates specialized tax terms that do 
not have analogues in everyday conversation.230 The highly de-
tailed character of the domestic law means that treatymakers 
may be unable to incorporate concepts directly; instead, they in-
tentionally leave gaps in the treaty so that domestic law can fill 
in the details.231  
Another reason for the gaps in treaties is “the connection 
between taxation and state sovereignty.”232 Treaties often defer 
to domestic law so that nations can retain some control over tax 
policy.233 Although international law always implicates sover-
eignty concerns, these issues are particularly strong in the tax 
context given that taxation implicates the revenue function of a 
 
 227. KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 26 (1989). 
 228. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1414.  
 229. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative 
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 829–30 
(1991) (“[A] complex statute may suggest a broader policy that requires a non-
literal, contextual interpretation . . . of the statute.”). 
 230. Id. at 828–29 (“The self-contained nature of tax law makes a plain 
meaning rule difficult to apply to tax cases.”). 
 231. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1416 (“The highly complex demands upon tax 
law are one reason for the contemplated gaps in treaty drafting.”). 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id.  
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nation, which in turns provides public goods and national de-
fense.234 Taxation is also a key component of a nation’s fiscal pol-
icy, which allows it to affect growth, prices, and unemploy-
ment.235  
It is also important to note that, unlike in the trade context 
where multilateral cooperation can contribute simultaneously to 
worldwide and national efficiency, international tax is predomi-
nantly a zero-sum game.236 For all of these reasons, we should 
expect a significant degree of retention of sovereignty in the tax 
treaty context. In fact, we do see this, both implicitly, through 
ambiguity in the treaties, and explicitly, through incorporation 
of the domestic tax laws.237 Accordingly, the degree to which tax 
treaties can provide certainty through the harmonization of tax 
concepts and terms is limited.  
As for stability, the network of more than 3000 treaties pro-
vides some benefits in this regard. Indeed, as Tsilly Dagan has 
noted, the treaty system creates a lock-in effect, which makes 
transition to a different system more difficult.238 There is, how-
ever, a serious cost to this stability, the dangers of which have 
become apparent. Long after the system proves useful, it will 
continue.  
G. OTHER GOALS 
Tax treaties also may serve ancillary goals such as the pre-
vention of nondiscrimination or the resolution of tax disputes be-
tween the governments. Both of these goals can be accomplished 
via other means, however. Tax treaties require competent au-
thorities to endeavor to resolve cross-border tax disputes and, 
increasingly, provide for mandatory arbitration.239 As was the 
 
 234. Id.; see also Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: 
International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 157, 167 (2008) 
(noting the “particular strength to the claims for tax sovereignty”). 
 235. Ring, supra note 234, at 168–69. 
 236. See generally Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Tax-
ing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Un-
satisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001) (noting that the self-interests of 
the nation should be served through international tax policy). 
 237. Kysar, supra note 47, at 1417 (“We therefore should expect a greater 
degree of retention of national policy in the tax treaty context. And we 
do . . . through reference to domestic tax laws.”). 
 238. Tsilly Dagan, Tax Treaties as a Network Product, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
1081, 1101–05 (2016).  
 239. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 25, at 57. 
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case with information exchange, there is no need to couple this 
goal with the divvying up of taxing jurisdiction.240 Other inter-
national agreements, like the approach taken by the European 
Union, can serve the same purpose.241 
Tax treaties also are said to accelerate international invest-
ment through their nondiscrimination clauses, which require 
that the treaty partners tax domestic and foreign investors sim-
ilarly.242 These clauses appear in every U.S. tax treaty in force, 
as well as the model U.S. and OECD tax treaties.243 Again, non-
discrimination could also be accomplished without the loss of 
taxing rights, through stripped-down tax treaties, investment 
treaties, or domestic legislation.244 Indeed, major multilateral 
and regional trade agreements already contain mandates 
against tax discrimination.245 The nondiscrimination principle 
as articulated in tax treaties was originally intended only to mir-
ror existing obligations under the commercial treaties and was 
not expected to have a meaningful impact.246 
 
 240. See Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 166–67 (discussing how interna-
tional tax treaties can “generate information sought by tax authorities”).  
 241. Id. (citing Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Con-
nection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises—Final Act—
Joint Declarations-Unilateral Declarations 90/436, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 (EC); 
Protocol Amending the Convention of 23 July 1999 on the Elimination of Double 
taxation in Connection with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enter-
prises, 1999 O.J. (C 202) 1 (EC)).  
 242. See generally U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, at 54 (exam-
ple of nondiscrimination provision); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 30, art. 
16, at 24–25 (same); Ruth Mason, Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality, 
2 WORLD TAX J. 126 (2010) (comparing nondiscrimination provisions in tax trea-
ties, WTO, and EU law); Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax Discrim-
ination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014 (2012) (analyzing the use of nondiscrimination pro-
visions in tax treaties). 
 243. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, at 54; RICHARD E. AN-
DERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶ 20.01 (2010) 
(providing an overview of nondiscrimination clauses in all U.S. income tax trea-
ties). 
 244. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 167 (noting the use of nondiscrimi-
nation clauses for facilitating international investment). 
 245. Mason & Knoll, supra note 242, at 1018 (“[P]rohibitions of tax discrim-
ination appear in major multilateral and regional trade agreements.”).  
 246. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM OF 
THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON THE CONVENTION WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME, art. 21 (1945) (“It will 
be observed that this article extends to all taxes, both Federal and local. Such 
extension, however, is in keeping with several commercial treaties (such as that 
with Norway, of 1928, and that with Germany, of 1923) to which the United 
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Nondiscrimination is a notoriously ambiguous and, at least 
in U.S. law, narrow concept.247 Under the “nationality para-
graph” of Article 24, the treaties bar the source country from tax-
ing foreign enterprises operating in that country in a way that is 
“more burdensome” than nationals of the source state in “the 
same circumstances.”248 Its scope is limited since the treaties de-
fine “similar circumstances” as excluding U.S. nationals that are 
taxed on a worldwide basis.249 This preserves the ability of the 
United States, for instance, to impose gross basis withholding 
taxes on nonresident aliens since they are not in the same cir-
cumstances as a nonresident U.S. citizen (who gets taxed on a 
net basis).250 In the case of corporations, this carve-out means 
the nondiscrimination principle has very limited impact in the 
United States. A corporation that is incorporated abroad is, by 
definition, not in the same circumstances as a corporation that 
is incorporated in the U.S.251 Other countries may define corpo-
rate residency on the basis of other factors, such as place of man-
agement, in which case nondiscrimination may have more im-
pact.252  
Under the permanent establishment paragraph of Article 
24, a country is prohibited from subjecting the permanent estab-
lishment (essentially the fixed place of business) of a resident of 
the other country to “less favorabl[e]” taxation than its own res-
idents “carrying on the same activities.”253 The permanent estab-
lishment paragraph has no such carve-out for residency, but it is 
often a struggle for courts and the Internal Revenue Service to 
determine whether foreign residents are “carrying on the same 
 
States is now a party. It has no practical effect, since our domestic taxation does 
not discriminate as between United States citizens and British nationals resid-
ing in the United States.”); Mary C. Bennett, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—
Nondiscrimination in International Tax Law: A Concept in Search of a Princi-
ple, 59 TAX L. REV. 439, 444 (2006) (discussing original intentions of nondis-
crimination provisions). 
 247. Mason & Knoll, supra note 242, at 1017 (“[J]udges, government offi-
cials, and scholars have failed to clearly articulate the . . . values . . . the non-
discrimination provision promotes.”). 
 248. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24, at 54. 
 249. Id.  
 250. Bennett, supra note 246, at 445. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. at 446. 
 253. Id. at 447 (discussing the U.S. Model Treaty with respect to the perma-
nent establishment provision); see also U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 
24(2). 
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activities” as residents of the permanent establishment coun-
try.254 Although one U.S. court has found that a U.S. tax provi-
sion violated this paragraph,255 the U.S. Treasury and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service have traditionally taken a very narrow view 
of this phrase.256 For instance, in assessing thin capitalization 
rules, which deny certain interest deductions for payments to re-
lated foreign persons, the position of the United States has been 
that these rules do not violate nondiscrimination because they 
also deny deductibility to related domestic tax-exempt enti-
ties.257 This defense is arguably unconvincing since the nonresi-
dent, for-profit lender should be compared to a resident, for-
profit lender.258 European courts, in contrast, have given the par-
agraph more robust interpretations.259 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the nondiscrimination 
principle and the large divide between countries in interpreting 
it, query whether it would be more effective to enact it as a do-
mestic provision. These routes may be a more forceful means at 
ensuring equal treatment of investments. Regardless, it does not 
appear that the nondiscrimination principle in treaties is provid-
ing a great deal of reciprocal protection, and in any case, like 
other provisions discussed above, nondiscrimination could be in-
corporated into international agreements that do not cede juris-
diction over the tax base. 
Finally, we could see tax treaties as serving as pre-commit-
ment devices, tying Odysseus to the mast lest he fall prey to the 
sirens’ song. Governments could recognize that they may fail to 
benefit from taxing inbound capital since, absent market power, 
the incidence of the tax is likely to fall on locals even if it is paid 
by foreigners, creating deadweight loss in the system. Neverthe-
less, governments may be enticed, politically speaking, to enact 
 
 254. Bennett, supra note 246, at 447.  
 255. Id. (“The opinion states that under the nondiscrimination provision, the 
[Internal Revenue] Service has no more right to deny interest deductions to an 
‘undercapitalized’ branch than it does to an ‘undercapitalized’ domestic bank.” 
(citing Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 491 (2003))). 
 256. Id. at 448–49 (explaining it is difficult to predict how courts would rule 
on this paragraph as compared to the United States Treasury and the Internal 
Revenue Service because courts have had very few opportunities to do so). 
 257. H.R. REP. NO. 101-386, at 568 (1989) (Conf. Rep.). 
 258. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 77, at 258–59. 
 259. Id.; see UBS AG v. Revenue & Customs Comm’r [2005] S.T.C. 589, aff’d 
[2006] EWHC (Ch) 117, [2006] S.T.C. 716 (Eng.). 
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such a tax since it nominally falls on a nonvoting sector, foreign-
ers. To save themselves from this inefficient outcome, they may 
bind themselves via international commitments.260  
A few responses are warranted. First, this argument is 
likely to apply only in the passive income context, where local 
rents are absent (thus justifying non-taxation). Second, a predi-
cate to this argument is that the inbound tax is borne by locals, 
which may be likely in a small, open economy but highly unlikely 
in a large, country like the United States, whose policies influ-
ence global prices, income, and interest rates.  
III.  DISADVANTAGES OF TAX TREATIES 
The above discussion concludes that the rationales for tax 
treaties are opaque and ultimately unconvincing. Meanwhile, 
there are potential disadvantages that they bring to the United 
States, as this Part explores.  
A. A QUESTION OF REVENUES 
Scholars have argued that the reciprocal nature of tax trea-
ties disadvantages developing countries by allocating taxing ju-
risdiction, and hence shifting revenues, from the country where 
the income is earned, typically the developing country, to the 
country of the taxpayer’s residence, typically the developed coun-
try.261 This literature points to the asymmetry of the countries’ 
investments flows as the source of the treaty process’s unfairness 
toward developing nations. Proponents of this view also cite eco-
nomic evidence, discussed above, that tax treaties have no effect, 
or even a negative effect, on foreign direct investment, meaning 
that the developing country has sacrificed revenues for little to 
no advantage in capturing investment.262  
The common account is that treaties between developed na-
tions do not cause similar revenue shifts since the countries are 
similarly situated. Yet conclusions from the developing country 
literature can be extended to treaties that the United States en-
ters with other developed nations when the investment flows be-
tween those countries differ, as is often the case in the modern 
era.  
 
 260. Thanks to Dan Shaviro for this point.  
 261. See supra note 1 for sources discussing this point.  
 262. See, e.g., Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
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The treaty policy of the United States has remained rela-
tively static since the 1960s, even though the United States has 
swung from being the world’s most important net capital ex-
porter to being a net capital importer due to the massive increase 
of foreign investment into the United States.263 The change 
means that the United States may lose revenue as a result of 
entering into the treaty whereas before it was likely to gain rev-
enues.264 In spite of the variances of capital flows, both histori-
cally and between nations, tax treaties remain markedly similar 
to one another and to their predecessors.265  
This dynamic stands in contrast to the bilateral investment 
treaty context, where the United States has recognized its status 
as a capital importer and has taken a more balanced approach 
towards weighing its investors’ interests against state sover-
eignty rather than protecting just the former.266 One possible ex-
planation for this disparity in approaches is that, under the lat-
ter, the United States is often sued as a source country, thus 
compelling it to reexamine its negotiating stances ex ante.267  
 
 263. H. David Rosenbloom, Toward a New Tax Treaty Policy for a New Dec-
ade, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 77, 83–84 (1991). 
 264. There have been no studies estimating the revenue impact of U.S. tax 
treaties and how they have changed across time as the United States’ capital 
flows have changed. A Dutch nonprofit has attempted to calculate lost revenue 
for certain developing countries with regard to treaties entered into with the 
Netherlands. See ACTIONAID, MISTREATED: THE TAX TREATIES THAT ARE DE-
PRIVING THE WORLD’S POOREST COUNTRIES OF VITAL REVENUE (2016), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534391488205311904/pdf/ 
WPS7982.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JJS-R663]. Another working paper attempts to 
assess the costs and benefits of tax treaties, using Ukraine as a case study. 
Oleksii Balabushko et al., The Direct and Indirect Costs of Tax Treaty Policy: 
Evidence from Ukraine (World Bank Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 
7982, 2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534391488205311904/ 
pdf/WPS7982.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Lu3-UCTD]. 
 265. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, 
in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 99, 99 (Karl P. 
Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (noting that about 75% of tax treaty terms 
are identical to one another).  
 266. Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Invest-
ment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 361 (2015) (stating that early ver-
sions of United States bilateral investment treaties heavily favored investor in-
terests). 
 267. SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43052, U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS 6–8 (2013) (stating that over the past two decades, there has been a sub-
stantial increase in treaty-based investment disputes due to the increase in in-
vestment flows; ultimately, resulting in countries, including the United States, 
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It may of course be possible that, although the United States 
runs a deficit in the aggregate, it runs surpluses with treaty 
countries. Frustratingly, the Joint Committee of Taxation makes 
no revenue estimates for tax treaties nor does it include them in 
the tax expenditure budget.268 This is because the treaties are 
Article II treaties and bypass the normal budget process.269 The 
executive branch has also chosen not to provide formal economic 
analyses of tax treaties.270  
Although I do not purport to undertake such a formal anal-
ysis here, I have examined a set of data regarding trade, capital, 
and financial flows in an attempt to shed some modest insight 
into whether treaties make economic sense for the United 
States. Scholars have long pointed out that investment flow im-
balances cause differences in revenue flows under tax treaties, 
but, to my knowledge, there has been no attempt to look at those 
flows in any detail, particularly on a system-wide basis.  
First, I surveyed the bilateral balance of payments data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which consists of flow 
data for any given quarter since 2003. Of the sixty-six countries 
listed on the IRS website as having tax treaties with the United 
States,271 this data included those of sixteen countries.272 Of 
those sixteen countries, U.S. residents were net borrowers from 
current, capital account, and financial-account transactions in 
 
to re-evaluate “the balance of rights for investors and other economic and non-
economic policy priorities”). 
 268. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 33 (suggesting remedies to create budgetary 
rules to allow Congress to consider costs and benefits of tax treaties). 
 269. Id. at 32–33. 
 270. Driessen, supra note 44, at 746 (“Executive branch negotiation and Sen-
ate consideration of a tax treaty are not subject to any budgetary rules or formal 
mandated economic analyses . . . .”); Kysar, supra note 2, at 33. Recently, but 
sporadically, JCT has added some general economic information regarding 
trade flows in their explanations of tax treaties but this is by no means compre-
hensive. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PRO-
POSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY, JCX-
32-11, at 16–19 (2011). 
 271. United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/united-states 
-income-tax-treaties-a-to-z [https://perma.cc/XG2K-Q4Q6] (last updated Jan. 8, 
2020). 
 272. These countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa. See infra Appendix, Part 
A. 
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thirteen countries over the time span from 2003 to 2017, 
amounting to net borrowing of approximately $11 trillion or an 
average $735.2 billion per year.273 They were net lenders in only 
three countries.274 For financial-account transactions alone over 
this time span, U.S. residents were net borrowers in eleven and 
net lenders in five,275 amounting to net lending of approximately 
$3.9 trillion or an average $260.3 billion per year. We could 
roughly estimate, then, that a supermajority of these sixteen tax 
treaties are losing revenues.  
Second, I studied the U.S. Department of Treasury Annual 
Survey of Portfolio Holdings, which consists of stock data at par-
ticular points in a given year since 2003.276 The Annual Survey 
lists both the value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the 
value of U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. Of the sixty-
six countries listed on the IRS website, two countries did not 
have sufficient security holdings to list. The remaining sixty-four 
countries were examined. Notably, the Treasury data revealed 
the United States had inflows of capital greater than outflows 
with respect to the tax treaty countries in every year in which 
data was collected except one (2006).277 From 2003 to 2017, the 
net flows were negative by $22.14 trillion or an average of $1.476 
trillion per year.278  
I also looked at the relative flows of each country for the year 
2017. Of the countries examined, thirty-six had inflows greater 
than outflows, meaning there were more holdings by that coun-
try’s residents of U.S. securities than U.S. holdings of those 
country’s securities.279 Twenty-eight countries had outflows 
greater than inflows, meaning that U.S. investors held more of 
 
 273. These countries were France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and 
South Africa. See infra Appendix, Part A. 
 274. These countries were Belgium, the Netherlands, and Australia. See in-
fra Appendix, Part A. 
 275. The U.S. was a net lender in Belgium, the Netherlands, Mexico, Vene-
zuela, and Australia with respect to financial transactions. It was a net bor-
rower with respect to France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United King-
dom, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa in such 
transactions. See infra Appendix, Part A. 
 276. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., U.S. PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF FOR-
EIGN SECURITIES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018 (2019). 
 277. See infra Appendix, Part B. 
 278. See infra Appendix, Part B. 
 279. See infra Appendix, Part C. 
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those countries’ securities than vice versa.280 Notably, the 
amount of inflows, in total, exceeded outflows by $4.54 trillion 
for that year.281  
Although it is clear that the flow data and stock data paints 
a picture of the United States as a capital importer with respect 
to its tax treaty partners, it is nonetheless difficult to conclude 
with any certainty these findings impact on U.S. revenues. First, 
any formal revenue analysis should account for increased invest-
ment as a result of the treaty. Second, even for the flow data, 
these are just snapshots in time, reflecting only the current eco-
nomic position of the United States via its treaty partners. Be-
cause the treaties are so entrenched, however, one can see the 
danger of committing to them given the fact that economic flows 
can reverse rather quickly and dramatically. Third, it is highly 
likely that the breakdown of flows differs between income types, 
which is relevant in calculating revenue losses from the treaties. 
For instance, if the U.S. is a capital exporter for royalties, then 
perhaps it is gaining overall from the treaties even if it is capital 
importing with respect to other types of income, like interest. 
This is because the treaty restricts source country jurisdiction 
over royalties but generally does not alter the treatment of in-
terest, which is generally exempt under the U.S. portfolio inter-
est rules.282  
Finally, there is a question as to how much of the income 
that is lightly taxed by the treaties is heavily taxed by the do-
mestic system. The answer could be considerably smaller than 
the trade flow data suggests because, at least in the investment 
income context, taxpayers can avoid tax on such income through 
the portfolio interest exemption and tax planning strategies that 
include the use of derivatives.283 Additionally, because the per-
manent establishment category overlaps so significantly with 
that of the domestic U.S. trade or business concept, we would 
expect revenue losses in this category to be marginal. Nonethe-
less, the degree of asymmetry in the flows suggests that formal 
revenue analyses of the treaties are warranted.  
 
 280. See infra Appendix, Part C. 
 281. See infra Appendix, Part C. 
 282. 26 U.S.C. § 871 (2018). 
 283. See generally Toby Cozart, Structuring Foreign Investments in U.S. 
Corporations Using Portfolio Debt Guaranteed by the Issuer’s Foreign Affiliate, 
6 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 398 (1988) (discussing portfolio interest exemption in de-
tail). 
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It should also be mentioned that revenue losses can also 
come about because of the interaction between the domestic law 
and the treaty or the disparity in tax systems.284 For instance, 
one could imagine that two similarly situated countries would 
sign a tax treaty. They may reason that any rate reduction they 
provide on source income of the other country’s residents would 
be counterbalanced by an increase in domestic taxes through the 
residual taxation of foreign source income of its own residents. 
This increase occurs because the domestic residents are also re-
ceiving the benefit of lower rates in the other country. If, how-
ever, a country does not tax on a worldwide basis, the calculus is 
different. Its residents may enjoy the lower foreign rate, unen-
cumbered by residual taxation. The territorial regime means 
that the lower foreign tax treaty rates will not effectuate an in-
crease in domestic revenues. This bargain may still be in the 
country’s interest, but the benefits are flowing to its residents 
rather than to government coffers.285  
The 2017 changes to the U.S. international tax system are 
likely to complicate the revenue picture of U.S. tax treaties. For 
one, the partial transition to a territorial system means that the 
United States is forgoing residual taxation as a residence state 
on foreign income earned by closely held corporations.286 Yet this 
is counterbalanced by the new minimum tax regime that is im-
posed on such income. The reduction of the corporate rate all the 
way to 21% means that no residual taxation will be paid on for-
eign income so long as U.S. corporations are taxed at a 13.125% 
rate abroad.287  
This picture is further exacerbated by the fact that the 
blending of tax credits is allowed to reduce tax liability under 
residual taxation for individuals and others who do not receive 
 
 284. See Roin, supra note 77, at 1767 (“Instead of a roughly equivalent rev-
enue exchange, the U.S. Treasury most likely loses more money from forgoing 
source taxation than it collects in additional residence taxation.”). 
 285. The United States’ transition to a partial territorial regime will mean 
that its treaty agreements may produce less revenue than before, a point that 
will be revisited below. See supra notes 51–65 and accompanying text.  
 286. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties and Developing Countries, 72 TAX L. REV. 
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3248010 
[https://perma.cc/KQ2D-9FWD] (noting that despite the reduction of source-
country revenues through tax treaties, residence countries have been reluctant 
or unable to capture their share of the lost revenues).  
 287. See TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 626 & n.1526 
(2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
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the benefits of territoriality. Treaties allow taxpayers to cross 
credit income that receives favorable treaty rates with high 
taxed income, thereby minimizing the limitation on foreign tax 
credits under U.S. law.288 This dynamic will also occur under the 
new minimum tax regime, leading to further revenue losses.  
To summarize, my data analysis cannot tell us that the 
United States is losing revenue from the treaty system, but it 
does cast doubt on the assertion that the United States, as a de-
veloped country, stands to gain uniformly from tax treaties. 
Given the differences in flows between countries and over time, 
it is problematic that the United States’ negotiating position re-
mains constant, and it is puzzling that U.S. tax treaties do not 
take into account differences in investment flows, disparities in 
tax systems, and various ways in which the model treaty may 
diverge from the national interest. Despite the enormous eco-
nomic and legal changes that have developed since the model tax 
treaties were first developed, far from becoming more heteroge-
neous, tax treaties seem to be converging.289 Moreover, despite 
the fact that Elisabeth Owens called for formal analysis of the 
costs and benefits of tax treaties nearly sixty years ago, there 
has been virtually no progress on that front.290 My findings, how-
ever, should serve to shift the burden onto treaty proponents to 
conduct such analyses. 
B. STAGNATION OF DOMESTIC POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TAX 
NORMS 
Another problematic effect of tax treaties is the stagnation 
of domestic policy and international tax norms. Over two dec-
ades ago, John Avery Jones cited the proliferation of treaties as 
problematically locking in both domestic and treaty policy.291 
 
 288. See Roin, supra note 77, at 1772–75 (explaining this phenomenon under 
the normal foreign tax credit rules). 
 289. See Elliott Ash & Omri Y. Marian, The Making of International Tax 
Law: Empirical Evidence from Natural Language Processing (Jan. 11, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3314310 [https://perma.cc4K69-4K77]. 
 290. Owens, supra note 62, at 452–53; see also Roin, supra note 77, at 1798 
(labeling tax treaties tax expenditures and calling for examination of their 
costs). I explore possible reasons for these phenomena below. See infra Part IV.A 
and accompanying notes. 
 291. Avery Jones, supra note 1, at 4. 
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Tax treaties cannot be easily changed because they are so nu-
merous.292 And, unless countries are willing and able to override 
tax treaties, domestic policy is stymied.293 The problem has only 
worsened since Avery Jones raised the issue,294 with the number 
of treaties having more than doubled since then.  
Of course, stagnation may not be a problem if the treaty re-
gime locks in beneficial policy. Although tax treaties may have 
initially served some valid purposes,295 they more recently have 
contributed to the breakdown of the international tax system. As 
discussed above, instead of easing double taxation, treaties have 
contributed to double non-taxation.296 This is a direct result of 
the architecture set up by the treaty system, relying on the mal-
leable concepts of source and residence, which are the founda-
tions of the domestic international tax systems around the 
world.297 This problem has grown exponentially with the rise of 
digital technology and immensely valuable (and easily shifted) 
intellectual property. Moreover, their requirements have in-
creasingly come into conflict with possible solutions to the prob-
lems plaguing the international tax system. Recent U.S. tax re-
form has brought this problem into the spotlight.  
1. The Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax and Potential Treaty 
Conflicts 
In 2016, Republicans began to set forth their platform to 
overhaul the international tax provisions.298 Their initial plan 
was to replace the corporate income tax with a destination-based 
cash flow tax (DBCFT).299 The DBCFT would have essentially 
been a modified VAT, with a deduction for wages.300 Like a VAT, 
the tax would also have been border-adjusted, meaning that it 
excludes exports and taxes imports without deduction for 
 
 292. Id.  
 293. Unlike the United States, not all countries can override international 
agreements through domestic legislation. Kysar, supra note 2, at 36–38.  
 294. See Avery Jones, supra note 1. 
 295. See supra Part I.B. 
 296. See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text.  
 297. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 298. H. TAX REFORM TASK FORCE, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CON-
FIDENT AMERICA 6 (2016), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/ 
files/ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z7Z 
-VP7Y]. 
 299. Id. at 27. 
 300. Id. at 27–29. 
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costs.301 Its features meant that the DBCFT would have treated 
debt and equity equally, removed taxes on investment returns, 
and eliminated incentives to profit shift and offshore activi-
ties.302 Taxing on a destination basis (where sales occur) offers 
advantages relative to taxing on an origin basis (where value is 
created).303 In general, the residency of customers is more fixed 
than that of corporations, and thus taxing a business on this ba-
sis likely reduces tax avoidance. Additionally, ascertaining 
where products or services are invented is an economic fiction 
that has proven impossible to execute, leading to the shifting of 
profits through transfer pricing games.304  
There are reasons to think that a destination-based ap-
proach should at least supplement revenue collection given the 
rise of the multinational corporation. However, the plan was cri-
tiqued, in part, for its incompatibility with the tax treaty regime 
if the DBCFT was considered a “covered tax” under the trea-
ties.305 If so, the treaties’ permanent establishment requirement, 
which essentially requires a physical presence in the source 
country before that country can exercise taxing jurisdiction over 
business profits, would forbid the imposition of a destination-
based tax that taxes where goods are sold.306 In short, the very 
feature that makes the DBCFT attractive is the same trait that 
makes it incompatible with the treaties—taxing at destination 
versus origin. 
In addition to the conflict with the permanent establishment 
limitation, the DBCFT also implicated other treaty provisions.307 
 
 301. Id. at 28. 
 302. William G. Gale, Understanding the Republicans’ Corporate Tax Re-
form, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ 
understanding-the-republicans-corporate-tax-reform/ [https://perma.cc/ZY67 
-WZF8]. 
 303. Id.  
 304. See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Role of Bor-
der Adjustments in International Taxation, AM. ACTION F., Nov. 2016, at 11–12, 
https://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/The-Role 
-of-Border-Adjustments-in-International-Taxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE4K 
-GY6H] (discussing transfer pricing with differing valuations of imports and ex-
ports). 
 305. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, Problems with Destination-
Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 229, 246 
(2017).  
 306. Id.  
 307. Id. (discussing implication of Article 7 (goods and services) and Article 
12 (intangibles that produce royalties)). 
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In order to include all imports, the DBCFT should be levied on 
intangibles that produce royalties and other types of deductible 
payments that can substitute for royalties since their exclusion 
would invite tax abuse.308 If the DBCFT is considered an income 
tax, however, then such inclusion would constitute a treaty over-
ride because it would violate the treaty provisions that forbid 
withholding on such payments.309 The DCBFT also might argu-
ably violate the nondiscrimination provision of the treaties by 
advantaging exporters over importers.310 Furthermore, if the 
DBCFT is not an income tax and therefore outside the treaty’s 
scope, treaty partners would be under no obligation to provide 
foreign tax credits to their residents who pay the tax.311  
A further issue results from the fact that U.S. corporations 
may no longer be U.S. residents under the treaty because, under 
the DBCFT, they would no longer be “liable to tax . . . by reason 
of . . . domicile, residence, citizenship, place of management, 
place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar na-
ture.”312 Accordingly, foreign taxpayers may no longer benefit 
from the treaty provision that reduces withholding on dividends, 
among other complications.313 
Another challenge is that if the United States were to enact 
the DBCFT, then its treaty partners may no longer have incen-
tives to maintain or renegotiate treaties.314 This is because the 
United States would be giving up its jurisdiction to tax income 
as the residence country; therefore, why should a source country 
provide relief from its withholding tax? On the other hand, if the 
United States was no longer taxing worldwide income, the 
 
 308. Id. (“[A]llowing royalties and derivatives to escape the tax on imports 
invites abuse (since there will always be lower tax jurisdictions).”). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id.; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: 
Some International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1343–46 (1996) 
(discussing impact of tax reform on importers and exporters); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, The International Implications of Tax Reform, 69 TAX NOTES 913, 921–
22 (1995). 
 311. Shaheen, supra note 88, at 592. 
 312. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 4.  
 313. Shaheen, supra note 88. 
 314. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 305, at 246; David A. Weisbach, A 
Guide to the GOP Tax Plan – The Way to a Better Way, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 171, 
214–15 (2017); see also Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected Inter-
national Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1029, 1074–76 (1997) (outlining various possible responses of foreign countries 
to the United States tax reform, including pressure to terminate treaties). 
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source country’s reduction of withholding tax would flow to the 
investor rather than the U.S. Treasury, therefore perhaps 
strengthening the source country’s ability to attract invest-
ment.315 The source country may also feel increased pressure to 
reduce its taxation of direct investment income considering the 
favorable tax treatment U.S. investment would receive.316 
Another concern would be the potential for tax arbitrage be-
tween the DBCFT, which would not tax income, and a treaty 
partner’s income tax system that allows for interest deduc-
tions.317 This arbitrage opportunity may induce treaty partners 
to terminate their treaties in order to impose higher withholding 
taxes on interest and dividends to U.S. residents.318 Congress 
may attempt to stave off such terminations by imposing its own 
withholding tax on interest and dividends to non-residents, but 
this may itself violate the nondiscrimination provision since the 
United States may not be taxing investment income of its own 
residents.319 Even if the provision was upheld, the United States 
may wish to condition any treaty exemptions of the new discrim-
inatory tax on reciprocal exemption from the treaty partner, a 
perhaps undesirable bargain for a country with reciprocal trade 
flows with the United States and a large tax base.320 
In short, the enactment of the DBCFT would cause chaos in 
the international tax community. The myriad issues presented 
by the tax have caused some to predict that its enactment could 
lead to the collapse of the treaty regime.321 Moreover, this prob-
lem is not specific to the DBCFT. Other significant new taxes in 
other countries pose classification challenges for tax treaties. In 
the past few years, the Indian Equalization Levy, the UK Di-
verted Profits Tax, the Australian Diverted Profits Tax, the 
Netherlands Excessive Severance Tax, and the Belgian Fairness 
Tax are all hybrid taxes of some nature, and serious questions 
have arisen over their relationship with the treaty system.322 To-
gether, these taxes and the U.S. reforms, discussed below, are 
 
 315. Shay & Summers, supra note 314, at 1075. 
 316. Id.  
 317. Id.  
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. at 1075–76. 
 320. Id. at 1076. 
 321. Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 305, at 246–47. 
 322. Roland Ismer & Christoph Jescheck, The Substantive Scope of Tax 
Treaties in a Post-BEPS World: Article 2 OECD MC (Taxes Covered) and the 
Rise of New Taxes, in 45 INTERTAX 382, 386–89 (Fred C. De Hosson ed., 2017) 
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part of a larger debate over taxing on a destination basis versus 
an origin basis.323  
More recently, France levied a tax on the digital revenues, 
which U.S. technology companies have argued unfairly targets 
them.324 Other countries are exploring similar digital taxes.325 
The digitalization of the economy poses a significant problem to 
international taxation. Since digitalization allows value to be 
created without physical presence, countries have increasingly 
become frustrated by the treaties’ requirement that physical 
presence is required for taxing jurisdiction.326 Nonetheless, a 
prior OECD effort to relax the permanent establishment concept 
to encompass digital activities failed.327  
The new digital services taxes attempt to avoid this con-
straint by being structured as an equalization levy on a gross 
basis.328 Since traditional withholding taxes are also on a gross 
 
(evaluating similarities between new taxes); see also M. Tenore, “Taxes Cov-
ered”: The OECD Model (2010) Versus EU Directives, 66 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 
162 (2012). 
 323. Itai Grinberg, The Future of Corporate Taxation in a Digital World, AM. 
ENTER. INST. (Apr. 19, 2018), http://www.aei.org/events/the-future-of-corporate 
-taxation-in-a-digital-world/. 
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 325. William Horobin & Aoife White, How Europe’s ‘Digital Tax’ Plans Will 
Hit U.S. Tech Companies, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www 
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OF DIGITALISATION: COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE REQUEST FOR INPUT—PART 
II, at 6 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-digitalisation-part 
-2-comments-on-request-for-input-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8WV-SWT6]. 
 328. See, e.g., Ashok K. Lahiri et al., Equalisation Levy (Brookings Inst. In-
dia Ctr., Working Paper No. 01, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
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basis and are still “covered taxes” under the treaties, it is unclear 
whether this approach will pass muster. The EU Council Legal 
Service issued an opinion that the European Commission’s pro-
posed digital services tax is not an indirect tax,329 which also 
makes it harder to contend that tax treaties are not in conflict 
with it since tax treaties demand certain requirements of direct 
taxes. 
Moreover, there is reason to think that the presence of the 
treaties affects the design of these equalization taxes to their 
detriment. Gross taxes, although sometimes required for admin-
istrative purposes, violate ability to pay principles.330 Moreover, 
the new equalization taxes have been fairly narrow in applica-
tion, applying to certain industries and not others, thereby cre-
ating efficiency concerns. Arguably, this narrowness stems, in 
part, from being hamstrung by the treaty architecture. Without 
a multilateral solution to deal with taxation of the digital econ-
omy—in fact, the bilateral treaties stand in its way—the pro-
posals have understandably evolved in a piecemeal fashion. 
Moreover, justifying these taxes by using the notoriously vague 
concept of value creation, which comes from the treaties, prob-
lematically sets no reliable guidepost.331 Although the OECD 
 
uploads/2017/01/workingpapertax_march2017_final.pdf (discussing India’s 
equalisation levy). 
 329. Mehreen Khan, EU Lawyers Question Brussels Digital Tax Plan, FIN. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/88e0a81a-cbf0-11e8-b276 
-b9069bde0956 [https://perma.cc/E7G7-S5QT]. In contrast, Wei Cui argues that 
countries should be able to freely design digital taxes so that they fall outside 
the scope of the treaty. Cui reasons that a treaty is a contractual agreement and 
parties can choose its scope. Cui also argues that, even if double taxation is an 
important goal (of which he is skeptical), tax treaties cannot be successful at 
this goal if they generate allocations that are in tension with countries’ desires. 
Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense at 20 (Jan. 2020) (un-
published manuscript), https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1469&context=fac_pubs [https://perma.cc/6B6R-8UBW]. 
 330. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in International 
Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX 
REV. 299, 306–11 (2001) (discussing ability-to-pay principles). 
 331. Michael Devereux, The Digital Services ‘Sutton’ Tax, SAÏD BUS. SCH. 
(Oct. 23, 2018), http://business-taxation.sbsblogs.co.uk/2018/10/23/the-digital 
-services-sutton-tax/?dm_i=17AR,5XL76,ELTIXU,N8496,1 [https://perma.cc/ 
HTM3-6QT2] (“[T]he problem with the DST . . . is that their proponents claim 
that the tax has different purposes . . . . [I]t seems likely that the design of any 
DST will reflect the obfuscation offered by its advocates as to why it should be 
introduced.”). 
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countries will likely revisit the definition of “permanent estab-
lishment,” it is unclear that stretching this concept to the point 
of disbelief will provide any useful parameters for taxing juris-
diction. 
We might search for a procedural solution to all of this. If 
the DBCFT presents difficulties of treaty interpretation, and 
was clearly not contemplated in the treaty’s design, then the 
states should endeavor to resolve the issue by mutual agree-
ment. Going forward, a clause could be inserted in Article 2 of 
the treaties to cover significant new taxes if the parties reach a 
mutual agreement to this effect. The hybrid nature of these taxes 
requires further clarification from the treaty partners, and ask-
ing courts and arbitrators to fill these significant gaps may be 
beyond their institutional capacity. Yet even if an administrative 
solution was achievable, the complexities resulting from the 
mapping of these taxes onto the treaty system expose the latter’s 
rigidity. International movement towards destination-based 
taxes or increased taxation at source may be preferable, but this 
is antithetical to the fundamental deal cut in tax treaties. As a 
result, the substance of the proposals has suffered, and the 
treaty regime makes the likelihood of such a shift more remote.  
The new recommendations of the OECD/G20 in revising 
nexus and profit allocation rules necessitates a dramatic rework-
ing of the tax treaty system. For instance, BEPS 2.0 proposes a 
reworking of the permanent establishment concept to allow for 
nexus if there is “remote yet sustained and significant involve-
ment in the economy.”332 As an alternative, BEPS 2.0 contem-
plates a standalone provision that gives market jurisdictions “a 
taxing right over the measure of profits allocated to them under 
the new profit allocation rules.”333 These proposals would require 
a reworking of the arm’s length standard of Article 9 and the 
resolution of contentious factors such as the definition of “sus-
tained and significant involvement” or, alternatively, how profits 
should be allocated.  
2. The BEAT  
Although Republicans abandoned the DBCFT, the 2017 tax 
legislation that was enacted also poses significant challenges to 
the tax treaty system. Among the changes to the tax law is the 
new inbound base erosion regime, which is designed to prevent 
 
 332. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK supra note 6, at 22–23. 
 333. Id. 
  
1814 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1755 
 
earnings stripping from companies that have been able to erode 
the base by making deductible payments to related foreign par-
ties.334  
The originally proposed inbound regime was the House ex-
cise tax.335 The excise tax subjected income from deductible 
items, including royalties and cost of goods sold, to an excise tax, 
which was designed to prompt taxpayers to elect to treat such 
payments as effectively connected income.336 The Ways and 
Means committee report made clear that the new tax was neces-
sary to supplement transfer pricing principles, which were in-
sufficient to stop inbound base erosion.337  
There is a strong argument that the proposed House excise 
tax would have breached treaty obligations because the tax was 
designed to hit multinationals without a permanent establish-
ment, in violation of Article 7 of the treaty.338 The excise tax also 
was vulnerable to the criticism that it was an indirect way to 
impose withholding taxes on royalties, contrary to Article 12 of 
the treaties.339 Additionally, the tax also arguably violated the 
arm’s length standard of Article 9 of the treaties because it would 
have applied to cost of goods sold between the related parties 
regardless of what parties dealing at arm’s length would have 
agreed to do.340  
The end result of the excise tax would have also been to tax 
foreign-earned income, with no foreign tax credit or double tax 
relief.341 Such criticism forced the House to revise the proposal 
to allow a partial foreign tax credit.342 This was the case even 
 
 334. See generally U.S. Tax Reform Has a Profound Impact on Inbound In-
vestment, ORRICK (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.orrick.com/ja-JP/Insights/2018/ 
03/US-Tax-Reform-Has-a-Profound-Impact-on-Inbound-Investment [https:// 
perma.cc/D9G2-38SE] (explaining inbound investments and lowering of U.S. 
corporation tax rate by deductions). 
 335. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 4303 (2017).  
 336. Id.  
 337. H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 
115-409, at 400 (2017). 
 338. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Guilty as Charged: Reflections on TRA 17, 157 
TAX NOTES 1131, 1134–35 (2017).  
 339. Id. at 1135. 
 340. Id.  
 341. Id. (“[Trading partners] are likely to retaliate by imposing tax on the 
royalties, interest, or cost of goods sold without a credit for the BEMT [base 
erosion minimum tax], and that will result in double taxation because there is 
no reverse FTC provision in TRA 17S . . . .”). 
 342. Id. 
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though the United States would have been crediting residence 
country taxes as the source country, when traditionally foreign 
tax credits are offered by the residence country for source coun-
try taxes.343 This revision reduced the revenue estimate of the 
proposal.344 
In part because of its tension with the tax treaties, Congress 
abandoned the House excise tax, instead enacting the BEAT, a 
new and separate tax.345 The BEAT functions as an alternative 
minimum tax, adding back in certain deductible payments to for-
eign-related parties (but not U.S.-related parties) to constitute a 
“modified taxable income” base.346 The BEAT liability is the ex-
cess of 10% of that base over the taxpayer’s regular tax liability. 
Notably, although it functions like the now repealed corporate 
alternative minimum tax, the BEAT does not allow foreign tax 
credits in the calculation of the base.347  
Importantly, the BEAT also allows parties to circumvent it 
because it exempts cost of goods sold, including imbedded royal-
ties.348 In contrast, the House excise tax would have left less 
room for circumvention because it would have applied to cost of 
goods sold. Unfortunately, because the House tax applied to cost 
of goods sold, it likely would have violated the arm’s length prin-
ciple of the treaties. 
Even still, the BEAT as enacted may be in tension with ex-
isting tax treaties. The alternative minimum tax structure of the 
BEAT is an attempt to accommodate tax treaties, but a group of 
EU Ministers asserted that the BEAT regime could be viewed as 
discriminating against foreign companies in violation of bilateral 
 
 343. Id.  
 344. The original revenue estimate for the excise tax was $154.5 million over 
the budget window period. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EF-
FECTS OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” SCHEDULED FOR MARKUP BY 
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON NOVEMBER 6, 2017, H.R. REP. NO. 
JCX-46-17 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id= 
5026 [https://perma.cc/KXE7-NVKK]. This was revised to $94.5 million after re-
visions to the excise tax, including the provision for foreign tax credits. J. COMM. 
ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND 
JOBS ACT,” AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 
ON NOVEMBER 9, 2017, H.R. REP. NO. JCX-54-17 (2017), https://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=startdown&id=5034 [https://perma.cc/QUP2-5GTE].  
 345. Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra note 3, at 53. 
 346. 26 U.S.C. § 59A (2018). 
 347. The corporate AMT limited foreign tax credits instead of disallowing 
them completely. Id.  
 348. Kysar, supra note 178, at 357. 
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tax treaties.349 Article 24(5) of our double tax treaties provides 
that treaty partners cannot tax residents of the other treaty 
country more heavily than its own residents.350 Arguably, the 
BEAT violates this nondiscrimination clause because a foreign-
owned U.S. entity will be subject to the BEAT regime whereas a 
U.S.-owned U.S. entity will not be. One counter-argument is that 
the BEAT applies regardless of who ultimately owns the corpo-
ration.351 Thus, the BEAT applies to payments from a U.S. entity 
to a foreign entity that is owned by the U.S. entity (a CFC), 
which indicates that the intent was to protect the U.S. tax base 
rather than to discriminate against foreign-owned U.S. par-
ties.352  
Another arguable path to treaty violation is Article 24(4), 
which commands that foreign residents be entitled to deductions 
“under the same conditions” as U.S. residents.353 The BEAT re-
gime, however, is arguably not equivalent to the denial of a de-
duction, and interest, royalties, and other items remain fully de-
ductible. Instead, the BEAT merely subjects the tax benefit 
conferred by such deductions to the 10% tax; denying a tax de-
duction would increase the tax on the item by 21%, not 10%.354 
Additionally, the base erosion rules are perhaps sanctioned un-
 
 349. Stephanie Soong Johnston, EU Finance Ministers Fire Warning Shot 
on U.S. Tax Reform, 157 TAX NOTES 1704, 1704 (2017). 
 350. The model tax treaty provides:  
Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or 
partly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more resi-
dents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-
mentioned Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement con-
nected therewith that is more burdensome than the taxation and con-
nected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the first-
mentioned Contracting State are or may be subjected. 
U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24(5). 
 351. Although a harsher result applies to foreign companies that were for-
merly U.S. companies, such disparate treatment is likely within the savings 
clause of the treaties, which allows the United States to tax its residents, and 
former residents, under its own domestic law. Id. arts. 1(4), 4(1); see also Bret 
Wells, Get with The BEAT, 158 TAX NOTES 1023, 1029 (2018) (arguing the 
BEAT is nondiscriminatory).  
 352. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Beat It: Tax Reform and Tax Treaties (Univ. of 
Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
587, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096879 
[https://perma.cc/9MCL-GSXD]. 
 353. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 24(4). 
 354. Avi-Yonah, supra note 352, at 1026. 
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der Article 24(4) because they are necessary to arrive at an ap-
propriate arm’s length result within the meaning of Article 9 of 
the treaties, although this argument seems less forceful since the 
BEAT applies even when arm’s length prices are charged.355 
The BEAT may also violate Article 23, which requires treaty 
partners to grant a foreign tax credit for income tax of the treaty 
partner “[i]n accordance with the provisions and subject to the 
limitations of the law of the United States (as it may be amended 
from time to time without changing the general principle 
hereof).”356 Since the BEAT offers no foreign tax credit, it may be 
inconsistent with the “general principle” of Article 23.357 It is 
possible, however, that the BEAT is not a “covered tax” under 
Article 2 of the treaty and therefore not subject to the require-
ments of Article 23 (although still subject to Article 24).358 If the 
BEAT did not fall within this category of “covered taxes,” then a 
treaty partner could not object to the disallowance of foreign tax 
credits.  
As discussed above, what constitutes a covered tax is a dif-
ficult question, and the status of many new taxes is in doubt.359 
Relevant to the BEAT context, however, is that the United 
States has previously taken the position that the AMT was cov-
ered by the treaties and the two taxes are structurally similar.360 
Another counter to the argument that the BEAT falls outside the 
treaties’ scope is that Congress chose to enact it as part of subti-
tle A (income taxes) of the Code.361 In favor of BEAT’s non-cov-
erage, however, is the fact that it denies deductions for payments 
to related foreign persons, therefore falling outside the definition 
of an “income” tax.362  
C. TAX ABUSE OPPORTUNITIES 
A third disadvantage of tax treaties is that they encourage 
tax avoidance as a result of the ceding of taxing jurisdiction and 
 
 355. Wells, supra note 351.  
 356. U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, art. 23.  
 357. Id.  
 358. Id. art. 2. 
 359. See Ismer & Jescheck, supra note 322, at 386–87; supra note 88 and 
accompanying text.  
 360. Rosenbloom & Shaheen, supra note 3, at 54. 
 361. Id. at 56.  
 362. Id. at 55. 
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the interface between the treaties and domestic provisions.363 
Since this was discussed in the context of whether tax treaties 
fulfill their promise of achieving double non-taxation, I will not 
discuss it here. But it is a significant downside and one that loses 
revenue.  
IV.  WHY DOES U.S. TREATY POLICY REMAIN IN THE 
PAST?   
If tax treaties have these negative effects and also fail to ful-
fill their purposes, why has U.S. tax treaty policy remained stag-
nant for decades? This Part will explore possible answers to this 
mystery. It begins with a discussion of how tax treaties suffer 
from a deficiency in process. It then explores the lock-in effect 
that occurs from having a proliferation of treaties. It then posits 
that a race-to-the-bottom dynamic is occurring between some 
countries seeking foreign direct investment, thus explaining en-
trance into the treaties.  
A. PROCESS DEFICIENCIES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Because tax treaties are Article II treaties, the House is en-
tirely cut out of the tax treaty process despite its long constitu-
tional pedigree as the initiator of tax policy on the domestic 
side.364 Somewhat puzzlingly, this stands in contrast to trade 
treaties, with which the House has remained involved through 
congressional executive agreements.365 The House’s participa-
tion in the trade treaty context has been justified, in part, be-
cause of its traditional role over revenues, as set forth in the 
Origination Clause.366  
 
 363. Julie Roin has argued that avoidance as a result of treaty rates is of no 
concern because the residual taxation of the residence country offsets the reduc-
tion of source country tax. Julie A. Roin, Adding Insult to Injury: The “Enhance-
ment” of § 163(j) and the Tax Treatment of Foreign Investors in the United 
States, 49 TAX L. REV. 269, 285 (1994). This view, however, does not take into 
account the fact that the residence country may fail to tax the income. Driessen, 
supra note 44, at 749 n.22. 
 364. Kysar, supra note 2, at 23 n.149. 
 365. JANE M. SMITH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, WHY CERTAIN 
TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREE-
MENTS RATHER THAN TREATIES 2 (2013). 
 366. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 799, 923 (1995) (noting that the Origination Clause may strengthen the 
argument that NAFTA is constitutional); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and 
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The treaty process often flies under the radar. Most of the 
treaty negotiating process happens behind closed doors, with 
multinational corporations strategically communicating their 
policy positions to negotiators.367 It is not surprising that the 
paucity in process benefits special interests like these corpora-
tions. Each step in the legislative process can potentially derail 
any proposal. The more robust process means the greater poten-
tial for policy failure. When the context is bestowing benefits to 
special interests, as opposed to the public, a less robust process 
will accrue to their benefit.368 Tax treaties reduce the tax bills of 
multinational corporations and do not increase taxes. Therefore, 
their relatively easy path to enactment favors such constituents 
at the expense of the public. Additionally, the resultant lobbying 
power of the corporations helps to explain why tax treaties exist 
in their current form—to benefit industry. The lack of process 
generally benefits policy that would otherwise be controversial 
in the legislative process. 
Thus, a nefarious explanation for why tax treaties look the 
way they do is that they are simply a less visible way to funnel 
U.S. revenues to multinational corporations. Seen as tax incen-
tives that do not have the scrutiny of the legislative or budget 
processes, they are invisible and against the public interest.369 
Perhaps then it is not so puzzling that the United States would 
remain in treaties that are antithetical to its interest—to be able 
to deliver benefits to powerful constituencies without some kind 
of reckoning.  
Groups that might normally be opposed to funneling bene-
fits to multinational corporations, such as labor unions, are ab-
sent from the tax treaty process, in spite of their engagement 
over the reach of our international tax system as implemented 
through domestic law.370 Domestic policy disfavoring outbound 
 
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1261 n.133 (1995) (noting that the Origina-
tion Clause may place limits on treaties involving revenues but disagreeing with 
Ackerman and Golove that House participation justifies the use of congres-
sional-executive agreements). 
 367. Driessen, supra note 44, at 745.  
 368. Kysar, supra note 2, at 35 (noting bicameralism could minimize the in-
fluence of special interests by making their preferences more difficult to enact). 
 369. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 33–39; Zolt, supra note 286, at 10 (noting 
greater transparency weighs in favor of a country using domestic legislation 
over tax treaties to establish rules for cross-border taxation). 
 370. Driessen, supra note 44, at 751. 
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investment is in direct conflict with the lowering of withholding 
rates through the treaty, yet public debate only focuses on the 
former. These advocacy groups may overlook tax treaties be-
cause the process forecloses open and vigorous deliberation. In 
fact, their significant participation in trade treaties suggest this 
might be the case since such treaties, as congressional-executive 
agreements, are subject to greater process than tax treaties.371  
The other major deficiency in process is the lack of revenue 
estimates of tax treaties, or any formal studies undertaken by 
the U.S. Treasury that might justify entrance into particular tax 
treaties.372 The lack of consensus on whether tax treaties in-
crease foreign direct investment and the reversal of trade flows 
that the United States has experienced over the past few dec-
ades, which almost certainly impacts the revenue picture of the 
treaties, makes the omission from the budget process especially 
troubling.373 
Not only are there no revenue estimates when the United 
States enters into treaties, the benefits they funnel to taxpayers 
also do not show up on the tax expenditure budget,374 which the 
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) publishes to account for rev-
enue losses from special tax benefits. Many decades ago, Stanley 
Surrey famously concluded that such preferences should be 
highlighted as equivalent to government spending since they 
constituted revenue losses.375 Among such preferences Surrey 
highlighted were certain tax benefits provided by tax treaties.376 
The absence of tax treaties from the tax expenditure budget al-
lows for an easier path to treaty conclusion.377  
One might try to justify omission of tax treaties from the tax 
expenditure budget as reflecting difficulties in defining the ap-
propriate baseline. Surrey and McDaniel argued, for instance, 
 
 371. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of In-
ternational Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1274, 1307–
16 (2008). 
 372. Driessen, supra note 44, at 749–50.  
 373. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.  
 374. Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 265, 306–07 (2012). 
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 376. PAUL R. MCDANIEL & STANLEY S. SURREY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF 
TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 59 (1985); STANLEY S. SURREY & 
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 168–70 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY & 
MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES].  
 377. Dean, supra note 374, at 290 n.117. 
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that reduction in gross withholding taxes are not tax expendi-
tures because they reflect an approximation of the tax burden if 
it were applied on a net basis.378 If the rate was very low or zero, 
as is the case for certain types of income under the treaties, then 
such justification for omission from the budget would not be ap-
plicable. Another justification for omission might be that the ex-
ercise would prove too challenging for the estimators.379 Presum-
ably, however, JCT could attempt to produce average tax rates 
applicable to net investment income on the domestic front and 
use this as an approximate baseline. A more straightforward al-
ternative, however, is to simply follow the CBO revenue base-
line, acknowledging that tax expenditure analysis need not be 
precise in detailing costs while still providing the useful function 
that such costs exist.  
Moreover, this line of argument does not extend to the reg-
ular budget process. In estimating revenues for purposes of the 
enactment process, if such revenue estimates were produced, the 
proper baseline is not a normative one but generally follows cur-
rent law with some prescribed modifications.380 In that context, 
the proper revenue baseline should be the 30% withholding rate 
applicable to net investment income earned by non-U.S. resi-
dents.381 
The paucity in process might also have several other rami-
fications. As discussed above, treaties do not seem to fulfill their 
stated or unstated purposes. Enhanced deliberation might help 
clarify the objectives of tax treaties, or expose the lack thereof.382 
Additionally, the process problem might also help explain why 
tax treaties are surprisingly uniform in nature, a suboptimal re-
sult given the variances in relative flows of the U.S. and its tax 
 
 378. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 376, at 168. 
 379. Dean, supra note 374, at 290 n.117 
 380. David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 
188–90 (2015); David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and the 
Budget Baseline, 157 TAX NOTES 125, 126 (2017). 
 381. Note, however, that if revenue estimates were undertaken on treaty re-
visions, then these would often be scored as revenue increases. The relevant 
baseline would be the existing treaty, and many recent revisions limit treaty 
benefits to address problems of base erosion and profit shifting. Thus, the true 
cost of the treaty, on a standalone basis, would not be reflected in the estimates. 
It could, however, be captured by the tax expenditure budget, which need not 
follow current law. 
 382. Driessen, supra note 44, at 748. Misstated purposes also risk mislead-
ing the judiciary in their interpretation of the treaty. 
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treaty partners.383 More robust process might help to create het-
erogeneity among the treaties, tailoring them to various national 
interests.  
Finally, although powerful constituencies shape U.S. treaty 
policy as a matter of political economy, there is reason to be hope-
ful that there is some room for reform of the process. Although 
tax treaties have historically been approved as a matter of 
course, the politically charged environment has made this less 
likely.384 Although opponents of tax treaties have blocked them 
for reasons unrelated to the problems discussed here,385 perhaps 
this controversy will shift the burden to proponents to analyze 
and justify their costs.  
B. THE LOCK-IN EFFECT 
Another obstacle to treaty innovation is the fact that the in-
ternational tax system is comprised of thousands of bilateral 
treaties. Any changes must generally be made treaty-by-treaty. 
As discussed above, the proliferation of the treaties has created 
a “network effect,” whereby the global community disapproves of 
deviations from the script.386 Tax treaties are based on a common 
standard that provides more and more benefits the greater the 
number of adopters.387 The OECD treaties have positive network 
externalities along the dimensions of predictability of legal con-
tent, enforcement, and the signaling of a credible commitment to 
a stable regime.388 But as the network grows, so do its costs.  
First, the initiators can exploit the network to extract “car-
telistic gains from potential competitors and monopolistic rents 
from its own users.”389 Second, there is a strong lock-in effect; 
the treaty remains in force even when the standard becomes un-
desirable because it becomes difficult for users to establish a new 
network. This is because any purveyors of a new standard will 
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have a difficult time recruiting other states to join the new net-
work without a critical mass that can reduce risk and transition 
costs.390 At one time, the United States and other developed na-
tions may have rationally preferred the treaties’ tilt towards the 
residence country when they were capital-exporting, but they 
are now locked into that position long after it no longer makes 
sense. As a result, the status quo reigns.  
C. RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
Nations may also enter into tax treaties with countries in 
which trade flows are obviously and persistently asymmetrical 
in order to receive legitimacy on the international level, although 
this is unlikely to be the case with established countries like the 
United States. They may hope to increase foreign direct invest-
ment through the reduction in tax burden, even though the evi-
dence on this is mixed.391 Countries could be engaging in a race 
to the bottom, whereby one country chooses the sub-optimal op-
tion of joining the treaty network because it fears others will do 
so as well, thereby crowding it out of the investment environ-
ment.  
In particular, source countries may assent to the regime in 
spite of its favoring residence countries because of a prisoner’s 
dilemma scenario.392 If all source countries are competing to at-
tract foreign direct investment, they could be in a better position 
to agree to not sign treaties and maintain their revenues. Antic-
ipating defection, however, a source country may choose to enter 
into a treaty because they may be better off if the other source 
country does not sign the treaty, although still worse off than in 
a world where the source countries all agreed not to participate 
in the treaty regime. They also will be better off than if they are 
the fool who did not sign the treaty when the other one did. 
Under this scenario, the countries are worse off if all join the 
treaty network since there is a perhaps only modest possibility 
of increasing investment with a certainty of fewer revenues. Yet, 
this is the likely outcome given that a worse outcome would be if 
one country joins the treaty network and the other one is left out. 
Coordination problems thus may explain why countries with di-
vergent interests enter into tax treaties.393  
 
 390. Id. at 176. 
 391. See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text.  
 392. See Baistrocchi, supra note 386, at 11. 
 393. But see Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 
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Finally, the world is changing, and developing countries do 
not seem as eager to sign double tax treaties as they once 
were.394 As I mentioned above, even developed countries have 
started to contemplate self-help regimes around the treaties.395 
Consequently, just because tax treaties have evolved as the 
building blocks of the international tax regime does not mean 
they will continue to serve that function. 
V.  UNRAVELING THE TAX TREATY   
In light of the foregoing discussion, how might we reconcep-
tualize the tax treaty? The world seems to be moving away from 
the prioritization of residence country taxation. The recent U.S. 
international reform, and proposed and enacted taxes in Europe, 
can be seen as strengthening taxation by the “source” country.396 
Furthermore, the double tax treaties have recently been under 
attack by developing countries, who now question whether it is 
in their interest to sign them.397 The pressure that globalization, 
stateless income, and technology have placed on the antiquated 
international tax system may cause other countries to doubt the 
relevance of tax treaties. As a result, the bargains long reached 
in the tax treaties may very well be finally upended.  
This is because the international tax system, based on arti-
ficial concepts of source and residence, is fundamentally at odds 
with the nature of today’s world economy. Geopolitical, techno-
logical, and economic forces, as well as the phenomenon of state-
less income, will require policy innovation that is in tension with 
the bargains reached long ago in tax treaties. The allocation of 
 
56 TAX L. REV. 259 (2003) (“Developing countries have benefited from the cur-
rent bilateral tax treaty practice . . . . They have never been forced, nor have 
they claimed to have been forced, into concluding a bilateral treaty with a de-
veloped country. In fact, in many cases the developing countries wish to con-
clude treaties with the developed countries, which often reject their . . . over-
tures.”). 
 394. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 181 (“Over the course of the last decade, the 
developed countries that were represented by the OECD have been losing some 
of their clout as a group.”).  
 395. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.  
 396. Although destination-based taxes forgo the concept of origin of income, 
and hence “source” countries, their practical effect will often be greater source 
country taxation.  
 397. See Martin Henson, When Do Developing Countries Negotiate Away 
Their Corporate Tax Base, 30 J. INT’L DEV. 233, 251 (2018) (concluding develop-
ing countries should revisit their existing tax treaty networks as their under-
standing of fiscal costs grows). 
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taxing rights no longer makes sense for many countries, both de-
veloped and developing, but instead serves small but powerful 
constituencies.  
The new international tax system will likely contain more 
destination-based rules, as a response to the ability of multina-
tional corporations to more easily game origin-based rules. So 
far, tax treaties have served to thwart such innovation, but the 
desperate need for revenues may eventually require it. Another 
possible innovation is to preserve origin-based taxation through 
a move to formulary apportionment or global unitary taxation. 
The current incarnation of the treaty system is ill-suited to ac-
commodate either type of change. Indeed, the treaty system hits 
the United States particularly hard, because, unlike other coun-
tries, politics have prevented the United States from adopting 
the type of destination-based tax that clearly falls outside the 
treaty system—a VAT.  
Thus, it seems that we should seriously consider jettisoning, 
or at least scaling down, the tax treaty provisions that allocate 
taxing jurisdiction. Some of the treaty provisions that do not re-
late to the allocation of income, however, should be retained, or 
at least could be kept with little cost. For instance, any shift to 
destination-based taxation is likely to be incremental. As a re-
sult, the rules regarding transfer price enforcement will likely be 
useful in the interim. The recent shift towards binding arbitra-
tion in the treaties makes this treaty function more valuable. 
The information exchange provisions are less useful with the rise 
of other international agreements in the area and should yield 
to those. Their retention does little harm, however, unlike the 
allocation of income provisions.  
Nondiscrimination is a useful concept in theory but has had 
little practical effect. Given the flexible interpretation U.S. 
courts have given nondiscrimination, its inclusion in the treaties 
does not stand in the way of tax reform. Even if the concept was 
strengthened, however, it would provide normatively appealing 
constraints on tax reform. 
Other functions, like the avoidance of double taxation, are 
somewhat incoherent, likely unnecessary due to domestic law 
provisions, and could also be refined. Revisiting the chart from 
above, we can summarize which features of the treaty should be 




1826 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1755 
 
Main Treaty Features 
Article 
Number Harm Outcome 
1. Residency Rules,  
Including  

















Harmful Abandon or Scale 
Down 
3. Limit Source 
Country Withhold-
ing Tax on Invest-





Harmful Abandon or Scale 
Down 
4. Alleviation of  
Double Tax  
Requirements 








Article 24 Helpful Maintain, with  
Clarification 
6. Transfer Pricing/ 
Dispute Resolution 
Article 25 Helpful Maintain, with 
Focus on Binding  
Arbitration 
7. Information  
Exchange  
Provisions 




sary Due to Other 
Agreements 
 
As discussed above, the OECD has completed a multina-
tional instrument that aims to create a streamlined mechanism 
by which countries can amend their existing tax treaties to in-
clude BEPS measures, subject to domestic ratification proce-
dures.398 The aim is to allow countries to update their treaties 
without the need for treaty-by-treaty negotiating. This effort is, 
 
 398. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
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in some ways, not as ambitious as it first appears. It primarily 
relates to proposals, like the limitation on benefits and manda-
tory arbitration provisions, that can be found in existing treaties 
entered into by the United States. In general, the BEPS process 
leaves in place treaty rules dividing the tax base between the 
two countries and does little to update those concepts. Treaties 
are also only amended if there is a two-sided “match” between 
treaty partners in choosing which of the new provisions to adopt. 
Still, one could imagine that the multilateral instrument may 
eventually extend beyond the BEPS project, inducing the United 
States to sign on to it.399 Somewhat paradoxically, the multilat-
eral instrument, which was designed to breathe new life into the 
double tax treaty regime, could be used to scale it down. Specifi-
cally, the multilateral instrument could be used to opt out of 
those aspects of the tax treaties that reallocate taxing jurisdic-
tion while maintaining the still useful features such as dispute 
resolution mechanisms and nondiscrimination provisions. This 
would allow countries to examine where it is in their interest to 
give up source-based taxation and where it is not. Essentially, 
rather than countries signing on to a system of treaties that are 
identical to one another, the multilateral instrument could be 
used to tailor treaties to the particular needs of a set of countries, 
creating a heterogeneous international tax system.400  
This new heterogeneity of the tax treaties, although disrup-
tive in many respects, could more fairly reflect the incongruity 
of trade flows between countries, differences in the elasticities of 
taxing foreign income between nations, variances in revenue 
needs, and divergence in gains from comity and reputation. Alt-
hough this diversification could occur unilaterally, the multilat-
eral instrument provides a mechanism to do so without jettison-
ing the treaty framework altogether or taking the controversial 
move of treaty termination. It would also obviate the need for 
painstaking treaty-by-treaty negotiation, although this would 
certainly still be a possibility. Moreover, it provides a mechanism 
 
 399. Yariv Brauner, for instance, has argued that it is difficult to imagine 
that the multilateral instrument will be abandoned after the BEPS treaty 
norms have been implemented. Brauner, supra note 90, at 1030. 
 400. This prescription is similar to that suggested by Victor Thuronyi with 
regard to developing nations signing “skinny treaties” that do not yield taxing 
rights, although my recommendation is broader than his since it applies to de-
veloped nations as well. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Treaties and Developing 
Countries, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 441, 445 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010).  
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to automatically update treaties as the circumstances of a nation 
change. 
Leveraging the multilateral instrument would also allow for 
intermediate options that a nation could opt into. Instead of 
abandoning the low treaty rates on withholding, for instance, 
they could be raised somewhat in between the current treaty 
rates and the statutory rates. Nations could even specify a range 
that they would tolerate, and if the treaty partner’s range also 
matches, then the treaty rates could be adjusted to the mid-point 
of overlap.  
Another more moderate option would be to expand upon the 
permanent establishment concept, allowing for taxation at 
source without a physical presence as is contemplated as a pos-
sibility in BEPS 2.0.401 This would provide much-needed cer-
tainty of legality for the incremental taxes that have thus far 
been implemented in various countries. Reforming the concept 
of permanent establishment could also make source country ju-
risdiction contingent upon administrative capacity of the source 
country.402 Since a country without the ability to collect source 
country taxes is arguably not losing anything from residence 
country taxation, treaty partners may decide this is an efficient 
allocation of taxing jurisdiction.  
An important aspect of this approach is flexibility. Cur-
rently, the multilateral instrument goes a long way in this re-
gard by allowing countries to opt in and out of proposals. Even 
the minimum standards, which signatories to the instrument 
are required to meet, can be fulfilled in a variety of manners. 
Since the multilateral instrument allows nations to pick and 
choose which treaties are subject to which new provisions, this 
would allow countries with asymmetric trade flows or different 
tax systems to opt out of the tax allocation provisions when it is 
not in their interest. One treaty partner’s opting out, however, 
will likely negatively impact the other from a revenue stand-
point. Once the other country sees that withdrawal is imminent, 
however, it may be in their interest to acquiesce to the unilateral 
withdrawal rather than risk the termination of the entire treaty. 
The countries may also decide to come to an agreement to scale 
up source-based taxation. Moreover, the multilateral instrument 
could provide a means to revisit the treaties if a country’s eco-
nomic circumstances changed.  
 
 401. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 6. 
 402. Brooks & Krever, supra note 1, at 170.  
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Rather than the 3000 tax treaties that are nearly identical 
to one another, we could have a system of bilateral tax treaties 
that are better calibrated to national interests. Moreover, by 
deemphasizing residence-based jurisdiction, this type of system 
may help to solve the stateless income problem. Finally, because 
the pared down treaty system would necessarily give way to 
more domestic solutions, international tax could respond more 
readily to current economic conditions and tax planning maneu-
vers. Although some might critique this solution as causing 
chaos in the international tax sphere, I would argue that we are 
at least on the precipice of that point already, and an ordered 
unwinding of the system is preferable to unilateral moves by in-
dividual nations that we are beginning to see.  
Another advantage of this proposal is that it would give na-
tions the space and flexibility to experiment with new ways to 
tax cross-border income. As countries have struggled with vari-
ous methods of taxing stateless income it has become apparent 
that fitting such new taxes into the old tax treaty model is a fool’s 
errand. Moreover, the time to explore novel approaches to cross-
border taxation is now, as the E.U. state aid controversy and 
other developments have suddenly cast doubt upon the 
longstanding status quo of preventing double taxation as the sole 
focus of the international tax system.403 
If tax treaties are at least partially unraveled, we might ask 
how and when the new system should be rebuilt. It is my view 
that even if true multilateral coordination of the tax base is not 
achieved, abandonment of or scaling down aspects of the current 
bilateral system is still worthwhile given their harmful effects. 
Ideally, however, a new system could be put into place as the 
older treaties are being unraveled. The best solution would be 
for nations to come together to decide on new principles that can 
accommodate our changing world.404 This could, for instance, 
 
 403. See Steven A. Dean, A Constitutional Moment for Cross-Border Taxa-
tion (Jan. 30, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (likening the 
current political environment in cross-border taxation to a potentially trans-
formative constitutional moment). 
 404. Optimistically, the BEPS 2.0 efforts are indicia that such coordinated 
innovation is beginning to occur. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK, supra note 6, 
at 22–23. Although a consensus has not yet been reached, the OECD/G20 has 
begun to seriously consider the expansion of market jurisdiction taxing rights, 
a minimum tax regime, and inbound base erosion rules. Public Consultation 
Document: Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” Under Pillar One, 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 4 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
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mean engaging in a true substantive multilateral treaty in order 
to design profit allocation rules. Such principles must extend be-
yond the EU’s current sectorial focus of digital taxation and the 
geographic focus on large U.S. corporations. Multilateral solu-
tions should also strengthen source-based taxation in instances 
where the residence country is not taxing the income. To the ex-
tent an initial allocation of taxing jurisdiction is retained, the 
multilateral instrument could, for instance, pursue provisions 
that “throw-back” the tax to a state if the state of initial appor-
tionment does not tax the item.405  
More modestly, the multilateral instrument could be used to 
resolve problems of inconsistent tax treatment. For instance, 
countries could agree to harmonize their tax rules in certain ar-
eas or to make adjustments to their domestic rules in order to 
achieve consistent tax treatment.406 It could also be used to re-
fine source rules to incorporate more destination-based concepts 
such as customer base.407 Domestic double-tax relief systems 
could then function in a better manner. Likewise, other problems 
 
beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approach 
-pillar-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9G6-8Z57]; Public Consultation Document: 
Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“Globe”)—Pillar Two, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. 5 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public 
-consultation-document-global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RYW-J67N]. 
 405. Wells & Lowell, supra note 20, at 38 n.181. Such a system would repli-
cate the “throw-back rules” adopted by several states in the United States. See 
Walter Hellerstein, The Quest for ‘Full Accountability’ of Corporate Income, 63 
ST. TAX NOTES 627 (2011).  
 406. See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral 
Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1652 (2001). Some multilateral proposals 
seek to simply replicate the OECD bilateral model treaty on a multilateral ba-
sis. See Michael Lang et al., Draft for a Multilateral Treaty, in MULTILATERAL 
TAX TREATIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW (Michael 
Lang et al. eds., 1998). Tsilly Dagan has also argued for greater coherence in 
harmonizing the international tax system through focus on such rules, although 
not through a treaty or instrument per se. DAGAN, supra note 5, at 311–12. 
Harmonization of tax rules has been done on a small, although not legally bind-
ing, scale. See Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes 
to Foreign Public Officials, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Apr. 11, 
1996) (representing a political commitment by OECD countries to deny a deduc-
tion for bribes). 
 407. See Paul Oosterhuis & Amanda Parsons, Destination-Based Income 
Taxation: Neither Principled nor Practical?, 71 TAX L. REV. 515, 515–23 (2017). 
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of cross-border arbitrage could be addressed by the multilateral 
instrument.408  
If multilateral solutions are not found, domestic law could 
step in to serve as a coordination device. For instance, domestic 
law could impart some of the give and take in foreign relations 
by premising code provisions on reciprocity. This would allow na-
tions to have more control over their revenue policy while also 
partially tying tax systems together. This would also address one 
potential objection to ceding more authority to individual na-
tions—that control over international relations would be lost be-
cause nations would no longer have the quid pro quo negotiation 
that the treaty system imparts. 
It would also remove some of the arbitrariness in applying 
different policies to treaty and nontreaty countries, even if the 
economics or politics of the situation call for uniform treatment 
between the two. A reciprocal code provision would instead tie 
foreign relations policy to the desired criteria. For instance, a 
code provision could reallocate profits from a foreign related 
party to a domestic-related party if the foreign profits were not 
subject to meaningful taxation abroad. This would be similar to 
the new kill-switch provisions in the 2016 U.S. Model Treaty but 
would have the advantages that unilateral decision-making 
brings.409 After all, precisely those countries that are reluctant 
to tax such income may also be reluctant to implement these new 
treaty provisions. Other destination-based statutory solutions, 
like destination-based taxes or experimental source rules, could 
also be utilized to preserve taxation of business income.410 As 
these rules are enacted by a powerful country like the United 
States, other nations may follow suit, creating harmonization 
without multilateral action.  
Another significant advantage domestic law has over trea-
ties is, at least in the United States, greater democratic process 
and transparency. With regard to statutory changes, both 
houses of Congress are involved, there is greater opportunity for 
 
 408. On a more ambitious level, proponents of formulary apportionment may 
wish to use the multilateral instrument to shift to such a system. 
 409. See U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 32, arts. 11, para. (2)(c), 12, para. 
(2)(a), & 21, para. (2)(a). 
 410. Such solutions need not wholly embrace destination-based taxation but 
could instead utilize some of its principles alongside the existing system. This 
incremental approach would allow for experimentation with a new form of tax-
ation on a platform less risky than, say, the destination-based cash flow tax that 
would have replaced the corporate income tax.  
  
1832 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1755 
 
deliberation, and any changes would be subject to the normal 
budget process.411 This has the advantage of bringing scrutiny 
over policies that benefit multinational corporations at perhaps 
great cost to the fisc. Although one can make the case that tax 
treaties allow countries to strategically enact different tax sys-
tems for foreign and domestic investors,412 such differentiation 
would still be attainable in, and would benefit from, a robust leg-
islative process. Such a solution would also lend itself to greater 
policy innovation and fiscal flexibility. 
  CONCLUSION   
To conclude, this Article finds fault with the traditional jus-
tifications offered in favor of bilateral tax treaties. Most criticism 
towards these treaties has been done on behalf of developing na-
tions, but countries like the United States also stand to lose from 
the status quo. Rather than accommodating tax reform or re-
flecting differences in tax systems or trade flows, the treaties, by 
and large, are entrenched and follow a single model. At a mini-
mum, formal revenue and economic analyses of double income 
tax treaties should be undertaken to explore whether the trea-
ties are in the interest of the United States. Further, this Article 
argues that the most damaging aspects of the tax treaties are 
those provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction. Countries 
should abandon or scale back these provisions, leveraging the 
new multilateral instrument as a possible means to do so. The 
hope is that this process paves the way toward a more dynamic 
and heterogenous tax treaty and the rebuilding of a more ra-
tional international tax system. Gone are the days where nations 
are able to invoke some notion of economic neutrality to justify a 
uniform international tax system. Instead, the system must do 




 411. See Kysar, supra note 2, at 33. 
 412. See Zolt, supra note 286, at 14.  
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APPENDIX 
A. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS DATA 2003–2017 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)413 
 
Country  
Net Lending (+) or 
Net Borrowing (-) 
from Current,  
Capital, & Financial 
Account Transactions 
Net Lending (+) or Net 
Borrowing (-) from  
Financial Account  
Transactions 
Belgium 921,88 170,508 
France -669,771 -509,618 
Germany -1,508,415 -616,350 
Italy -311,887 -2259 
Luxembourg -126,115 -149,878 
Netherlands 1,273,415 300,870 
United Kingdom -651,997 -863,954 
Canada -284,902 -226,364 
Mexico -943,492 82,432 
Venezuela -212,379 25,799 
Australia 785,465 305,549 
China -5,745,479 -1,435,305 
India -344,510 -26,552 
Japan -2,009,670 -759,504 
Republic of Korea -366,308 -199,994 
South Africa -4448 -612 




 413. See Table 1.3. U.S. International Transactions, BUREAU OF ECON. 
ANALYSIS: INTERACTIVE DATA, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID= 
62&step=1 (follow “International Transactions (ITA)”; then follow “Table 1.3. 
U.S. International Transactions, Expanded Detail by Area and Country”).  
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B. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS, 2003–2017(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)414 
Second, I studied the U.S. Department of Treasury Annual 
Survey of Portfolio Holdings, which consists of stock data at par-
ticular points in a given year since 2003. The Annual Survey lists 
both the value of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the value 
of U.S. portfolio holdings of foreign securities. Of the sixty-six 
countries listed on the IRS website, two countries did not have 
sufficient security holdings to list. The rest were examined. No-
tably, the Treasury data revealed the U.S. had inflows of capital 
greater than outflows with respect to the tax treaty countries in 
every year in which data was collected except one (2006). From 
2003 to 2017, the net flows were negative by $22.14 trillion or an 
average of $1.476 trillion per year.  
 
Year 
Tax Treaty Country 
Holdings of U.S.  
Securities at End of 
June of Year 
Shown 
Market Value of 
U.S. Holdings of 
Tax Treaty Country 
Securities at End of 
the Year Shown Net Flows 
2017 13,462,660 12,408,946 -1,053,714 
2016 12,580,491 9,891,264 -2,689,227 
2015 12,563,446 9,454,779 -3,108,667 
2014 12,080,917 9,604,305 -2,476,612 
2013 10,564,471 9,130,409 -1,434,062 
2012 9,659,592 7,958,388 -1,701,204 
2011 9,212,767 6,840,849 -2,371,918 
2010 7,893,465 6,763,362 -1,130,103 
2009 7,167,285 5,976,711 -1,190,574 
2008 7,646,906 4,291,407 -3,355,499 
 
 414. See Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities at the End of the Period Shown, 
DEPT. OF THE TREASURY/FED. RESERVE BD.: TREASURY INT’L CAPITAL SYS. (Apr. 
30, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/ 
Pages/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/H56D-ZZJ9]; Market Value of U.S. Holdings 
of Foreign Securities at the End of the Year Shown, DEPT. OF THE TREAS-
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2007 7,307,148 7,219,707 -87,441 
2006 5,842,935 5,990,896 147,961 
2005 5,164,573 4,609,105 -555,468 
2004 4,505,334 3,786,635 -718,699 
2003 3,571,856 3,152,282 -419,574 
 Total Net Flows -22,144,801 
 Average Net Flows Per Year -1,476,320 
 
C. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY DATA BY COUNTRY, 2017 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)415 
 
Countries and  
Regions 
Value of  
Foreign Hold-
ings of U.S. Se-
curities as of 
June 20, 2017 
Value of U.S 
Portfolio  
Holdings of  
Foreign  
Securities as of 
Dec. 31, 2017 Net Flows 
Armenia (11) 622 284 -338 
Australia  270,762 354,873 84,111 
Austria 19,934 32,061 12,127 
Azerbaijan (11) 7,361 1,629 -5732 
Bangladesh 1,005 924 -81 
Barbados 23,793 2,352 -21,441 
Belarus (11) 151 1,012 861 
Belgium and Luxembourg (5) NA NA NA 
Belgium (5) 690,855 72,481 -618,374 
Bulgaria 169 202 33 
Canada 1,060,832 995,893 -64,939 
China (21) 1,540,549 162,282 -1,378.267 
Cyprus 620 2,115 1495 
Czech Republic (10) 23,507 4,764 -18,743 
Denmark 124,571 110,150 -14,421 
 
 415. See Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities at the End of the Period Shown, 
supra note 414; Market Value of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities at the End 
of the Year Shown, supra note 414.   
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Egypt 8,548 8,093 -455 
Estonia (11) 457 214 -243 
Finland 45,098 47,152 2054 
France 291,810 604,774 312,964 
Georgia (11) 74 953 879 
Germany 427,172 494,275 67,103 
Greece 3,935 9,988 6053 
Hungary 2,557 12,632 10,075 
Iceland 3,395 2,600 -795 
India 133,423 194,444 61,021 
Indonesia 33,974 73,228 39,254 
Ireland 1,068,048 495,403 -572,645 
Israel 87,640 66,211 -21,429 
Italy 78,187 140,214 62,027 
Jamaica 976 1,059 83 
Japan 1,998,329 1,132,251 -866,078 
Kazakhstan (11) 28,523 5,688 -22,835 
Korea, South 281,754 263,113 -18,641 
Kyrgyzstan (11) NA  0 NA 
Latvia (11) 2,095 219 -1876 
Lithuania (11) 281 1,444 1163 
Luxembourg (5) 1,397,779 145,873 -1,251,906 
Malta 1,499 1,260 -239 
Mexico 97,115 162,693 65,578 
Morocco 1,811 0 -1811 
Mozambique 355 2,249 1894 
Netherlands 397,974 537,731 139,757 
Netherlands Antilles (22) NA NA NA 
New Zealand 26,582 20,468 -6114 
Norway 340,323 71,188 -269,135 
Pakistan 3,830 3,430 -400 
Philippines 42,703 27,545 -15,158 
Poland 36,035 26,669 -9366 
Portugal 8,358 14,924 6566 
Romania 3,374 4,196 822 
Russia (11) 103,403 69,191 -34.212 
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Slovakia (10) 314 386 72 
Slovenia (6) 2,176 1,706 -470 
South Africa 22,393 115,362 92,969 
Spain 59,953 158,215 98,262 
Sri Lanka 1,039 4,461 3422 
Sweden 180,244 172,330 -7914 
Switzerland 823,897 505,951 -317,946 
Tajikistan (11) 1 47 46 
Thailand 79,193 51,056 -28,137 
Trinidad and Tobago 9,748 677 -9071 
Tunisia 1,089 1,842 753 
Turkey 59,367 39,814 -19,553 
Turkmenistan (11)   0  
Ukraine (11) 2,270 8,978 6708 
United Kingdom 1,493,215 1,473,490 -19,725 
Uzbekistan (11) 4 0 -4 
Venezuela 5,609 3,014 -2595 
Total 13,462,660 8,919,723 -4,542,937 
 
 
 
 
